finding Article III ripeness because the case concerned a “pre-enforcement facial challenge” to the individual mandate and the fact that “[b]y permitting this lawsuit to be filed three and one-half years before the effective date ... the only thing that changes is that all three layers of the federal judiciary will be able to reach considered merits decisions ... before the law takes effect”
How later courts described this case
- finding Article III ripeness because the case concerned a “pre-enforcement facial challenge” to the individual mandate and the fact that “[b]y permitting this lawsuit to be filed three and one-half years before the effective date ... the only thing that changes is that all three layers of the federal judiciary will be able to reach considered merits decisions ... before the law takes effect”
- holding that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s provision for a “shared responsibility payment” for those *79 failing to comply with the individual mandate to purchase health insurance imposes a “penalty” on those failing to do so for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act but a “tax” on those without insurance for purposes of the Congress’ taxing power
- recognizing that Congress has broad authority under the Commerce Clause, not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states, and extending to activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, including activities that do so only when aggregated with similar activities of others
- stating that “[i]n distinguishing penalties from taxes, this Court has explained that if the concept of penalty means anything, it means punishment for an unlawful act or omission” and that “the shared responsibility payment may for constitutional purposes be considered a tax, not a penalty.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by United States v. Kenneth Rose, 714 F.3d 362 (2013)
- U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012), calls into question whether
Questioned by United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118 (2015)
- U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) (NFIB), calls into question our decision in
Distinguished
Distinguished by Tex. v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (2018)
So long as the shared-responsibility payment is zero, the saving construction articulated in NFIB is inapplicable and the Individual Mandate cannot be upheld under Congress's Tax Power.
Distinguished by United States v. Marcus Edwards, 584 F. App'x 728 (2014)
— U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012), is inapplicable here because § 841(a) does not compel commerce.
The opinion
Justice Thomas,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons stated in our joint opinion, but I write separately to say a word about the Commerce Clause. The joint dissent and The Chief Justice correctly apply *708 our precedents to conclude that the Individual Mandate is beyond the power granted to Congress under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Under those precedents, Congress may regulate “economic activity [that] substantially affects interstate commerce.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 560 (1995). I adhere to my view that “the very notion of a ‘substantial effects’ test under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the original understanding of Congress’ powers and with this Court’s early Commerce Clause cases.” United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Lopez, supra, at 584-602 (same); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U. S. 1, 67-69 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). As I have explained, the Court’s continued use of that test “has encouraged the Federal Government to persist in its view that the Commerce Clause has virtually no limits.” Morrison, supra, at 627 . The Government’s unprecedented claim in this suit that it may regulate not only economic activity but also inactivity that substantially affects interstate commerce is a case in point.