holding that a trial court’s restriction on a habeas petitioner’s cross-examination of police officers regarding the victim’s prior unsubstantiated claims of assault was both contrary to and an unreasonable application of Lucas
How later courts described this case
- holding that a trial court’s restriction on a habeas petitioner’s cross-examination of police officers regarding the victim’s prior unsubstantiated claims of assault was both contrary to and an unreasonable application of Lucas
- discussing Fowler v. Sacramento Cty. Sheriff's Dept., 421 F.3d 1027, 1035-1038 (C.A.9 2005) and Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1098-1101 (C.A.9 2009)
- relying in part on Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986)
- “Additionally, a violation of the right to present a defense does not occur any time such evidence is excluded, but rather only when its exclusion is ‘arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes [the exclusionary rule is] designed to serve.’ ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GOODWIN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The appellant did not present in his appeal to this court a competency-of-counsel question, and I believe that his failure timely to request a Miller hearing to support his effort to impeach the complaining witness was a default by the defense. Rejection of the proffered evidence, therefore, was not a constitutional error by the state trial court. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada complied with the requirements of AEDPA. I would affirm the judgment.