finding as an inappropriate yardstick by which to measure the sufficiency of a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination California's "more likely than not" standard and reversing defendant's conviction because the permissible inferences of discrimination, which caused the district judge to comment that the case was "close" and the California Supreme Court to note its suspicion that all three remaining black jurors were removed, resulting in an all white jury, were sufficient to establish a prima facie case
How later courts described this case
- finding as an inappropriate yardstick by which to measure the sufficiency of a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination California's "more likely than not" standard and reversing defendant's conviction because the permissible inferences of discrimination, which caused the district judge to comment that the case was "close" and the California Supreme Court to note its suspicion that all three remaining black jurors were removed, resulting in an all white jury, were sufficient to establish a prima facie case
- holding that it violated Batson for a state court to speculate about plausible race-neutral reasons for striking jurors in determining whether the defense had made out a prima facie case under People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978), and noting that “[t]he inherent uncertainty present in inquiries of discriminatory purpose counsels against engaging in needless and imperfect speculation when a direct answer can be obtained by asking a simple question”
- holding that clear and convincing evidence showed that the prosecution’s strikes were racially determined when: no facts other than race could explain the strikes; the prosecution used shuffling and disparate questioning during the selection; the prosecution expressed pretextual positions; and the prosecution’s notes showed the use of a jury selection manual that included racial stereotypes
- holding that a prima facie case under Batson had been established when “the inference of discrimination was sufficient to invoke a comment by the trial judge that ‘we are very close,’ and on review, the California Supreme Court acknowledged that ‘it certainly looks suspicious that all three African-American prospective jurors were removed from the jury’”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Commonwealth v. Jones, 597 Pa. 286 (2008)
Appellant nevertheless maintains that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005), decided one week before this Court’s remand in the instant case, calls into question the applicability of Uderra.
The opinion
Justice Thomas,
dissenting.
The Court says that States “have flexibility in formulating appropriate procedures to comply with Batson [v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986)],” ante, at 168, but it then tells California how to comply with “the prima facie inquiry mandated by Batson,” ante this page. In Batson itself, this Court disclaimed any intent to instruct state courts on how to implement its holding. 476 U. S., at 99 (“We decline, however, to formulate particular procedures to be followed upon a de *174 fendant’s timely objection to a prosecutor’s challenges”); id., at 99-100, n. 24 . According to Batson , the Equal Protection Clause requires that prosecutors select juries based on factors other than race — not that litigants bear particular burdens of proof or persuasion. Because Batson’s burden-shifting approach is “a prophylactic framework” that polices racially discriminatory jury selection rather than “an independent constitutional command,” Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. S. 551, 555 (1987), States have “wide discretion, subject to the minimum requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, to experiment with solutions to difficult problems of policy,” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U. S. 259, 278 (2000); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 438-439 (2000). California’s procedure falls comfortably within its broad discretion to craft its own rules of criminal procedure, and I therefore respectfully dissent.