explaining that the ordinary meaning of “individual,” the fact that “federal statutes routinely distinguish between an ‘individual’ and an organizational entity of some kind,” and that the Court “generally seek[s] to respect Congress’ decision to use different terms to describe different categories of people or things” contributed to its determination that “individual” as used in the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 referred to a natural person
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the ordinary meaning of “individual,” the fact that “federal statutes routinely distinguish between an ‘individual’ and an organizational entity of some kind,” and that the Court “generally seek[s] to respect Congress’ decision to use different terms to describe different categories of people or things” contributed to its determination that “individual” as used in the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 referred to a natural person
- recognizing that although “Congress is understood to legislate against a background of common-law adjudicatory principles,” “Congress plainly can override those principles,” through, for example, statutory text that evinces a clear intent to the contrary (citation and quotes omitted)
- holding that federal statute creating cause of action against an "individual" for acts of torture and extrajudicial killings applies only to human beings, based on the "ordinary meaning" of the word and the way Congress distinguishes between individuals and artificial entities
- holding that the term "individual” in the Torture Victim Protection Act meant “natural person,” but reiterating that courts should "respect Congress’ decision to use different terms to describe different categories of people or things” (citation omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Breyer,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion with one qualificatipn. The word “individual” is open to multiple interpretations, permitting it, linguistically speaking, to include natural persons, corporations, and other entities. Thus, I do not believe that word alone is sufficient to decide this case.
The legislative history of the statute, however, makes up for whatever interpretive inadequacies remain after considering language alone. See, e. g., ante, at 459 (describing markup session in which one of the bill’s sponsors proposed an amendment containing the word “individual” to “ ‘make it clear’” that the statute applied to “‘individuals and not to corporations’ ”); Hearing on S. 1629 et al. before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 65 (1990) (witness explaining to Committee that there would be a “problem” with suing an “independent entity or a series of entities that are not governments,” such as the Palestine Liberation Organization); id., at 75 (allaying concerns that there will be a flood of lawsuits “because of the requirement [in the statute] that an individual has to identify his or her precise torture[r] and they have to be both in the United States”); see also ante, at 458-459 (making clear that peti *462 tioners’ citations to the legislative history “do not help their cause”). After examining the history in detail, and considering it along with the reasons that the Court provides, I join the Court’s judgment and opinion.