finding that defendant’s assumption that all employees in the class would be entitled to receive the maximum damages of 30 days of penalty wages was improper because “[m]any employees may have been paid only a few days late and, consequently, would be entitled to fewer days of penalty wages”
How later courts described this case
- finding that defendant’s assumption that all employees in the class would be entitled to receive the maximum damages of 30 days of penalty wages was improper because “[m]any employees may have been paid only a few days late and, consequently, would be entitled to fewer days of penalty wages”
- holding that 21 damage waivers were valid and effective unless the defendant could prove to a “legal certainty” that damages exceeded $5,000,000
- explaining different tests that apply to evaluating the amount-in-controversy requirement depending on whether the plaintiff alleges a damages amount, and when statutory attorney’s fees can be included in the jurisdictional minimum
- stating that, in general, attorneys’ fees are only used to calculate the jurisdictional amount when authorized by the underlying statute and that attorneys’ fees have been used to calculate the amount in a class action
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013)
479 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds by Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. 588
Overruled on other grounds by Robert Rodriguez v. At&t Mobility Services LLC, 728 F.3d 975 (2013)
479 F.3d 994, 1000 (2007), overruled in part by Rodriguez v. AT & T Mobility 27 Servs. LLC, 728 F.3d 975
Overruled — as noted by a later court
The Ninth Circuit recently held “that Lowdermilk has been effectively overruled [by Standard Fire Ins.
medium confidenceAbrogated on other grounds by Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013)
]” Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994, 996 (9th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. 558, 133 S.Ct. 1345, 185 L.Ed.2d 439 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Declined to follow by Olson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 961 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (2013)
Accordingly, we reject this argument for the same reason we reject Defendants' Lowdermilk argument.
The opinion
KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Our analysis must begin with the pleading. The pleading requires no new law, just the well reasoned decisions in Abrego Abrego, 1 Sanchez, 2 and Singer. 3 The complaint did not plead a specific amount in controversy.
Plaintiff filed the case in state court. For the defendant to avoid remand after removing the case to federal court, it had to show that the matter in controversy “exceeds” $5 million. 4 In the days when complaints stated specific ad damnums, cases concerning amount in controversy requirements were simple to resolve by following St Paul Mercury. 5 Now that complaints often do not state specific ad damnums, we (and our sister circuits) have developed an extensive body of precedent governing how to apply amount in controversy requirements. 6
The complaint in this case is poorly drafted. It contradicts itself about the amount in controversy. In the caption area, the complaint says that “THE AGGREGATE OF CLAIMS DOES NOT EXCEED 5 MILLION DOLLARS.” In paragraph 4, under a heading “JURISDICTION AND VENUE,” it says the “[t]he aggregate total of the claims pled herein do [sic] not exceed five million dollars.” So far, clear as a bell, and an easy affirmance of the remand.
But the prayer for relief contradicts the complaint’s previous statements. The *1004 prayer first asks for an award “in total less than five million dollars” for the unpaid wages and penalties. Then, after a semicolon separating the claim for “less than five million dollars” from the additional relief sought, the prayer asks that the court “award plaintiffs attorney fees.” We held in Galt that “where an underlying statute authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees, ... such fees may be included in the amount in controversy.” 7 The complaint makes all of its claims pursuant to several Oregon statutes. 8 Related Oregon statutes on costs provide for attorneys’ fees in addition to the costs and disbursements otherwise provided for. 9 Since our precedents hold that the amount in controversy includes not only the amount of the claim, but, also and additionally, the attorneys’ fees, 10 the Oregon attorneys’ fees get added to the “amount less than $5 million” claimed by the plaintiff to determine the amount in controversy.
Because attorneys’ fees get added to the damages, and all the complaint says is that the damages will not exceed $5 million, the complaint does not say whether the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. It could be $10,000 plus attorneys’ fees (below the jurisdictional requirement), or $4,999,999.99 plus attorneys’ fees (conferring federal jurisdiction). Sometimes a formal judicial admission can establish that a claim uncertain in amount will not meet the federal jurisdictional requirement. 11 No such admission has been made in this case. 12 Thus, the majority errs in saying that the plaintiff has pleaded an amount in controversy less than $5 million. 13
The law is already established in our circuit for CAFA 14 cases where the pleading does not specify whether the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. Under Abrego Abrego, “[wjhere the complaint does not specify the amount of damages sought, the removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy requirement has been met.” 15 To make this determination, the court should consider, in addition to the complaint itself, “facts in the removal petition and ... summary judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.” 16
The district court did not determine whether the defendant established by a preponderance of the evidence that the *1005 amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. Instead, overlooking the prayer for attorneys’ fees, the court treated the complaint as though it had pleaded an amount in controversy less than $5 million. Because of that incorrect reading (of a complaint admittedly difficult to read), the district court did not evaluate the facts in the removal petition to inform its determination of the amount in controversy.
The majority does not make a preponderance of the evidence determination. It applies the more demanding standard of proof to a legal certainty. But, as Abrego Abrego sets forth, the “legal certainty,” or “good faith,” test from St Paul Mercury is applicable where the complaint at issue specifies an amount in controversy lower than the jurisdictional minimum, not where the complaint fails to specify what the amount in controversy is. 17
For these reasons, we should remand this case to the district court for it to make the necessary determination under a preponderance of the evidence standard.
. Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676 (9th Cir.2006)
. Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398 (9th Cir.1996).
. Singer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373 (9th Cir.1997).
. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d)(2).
. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Company, 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 , 58 S.Ct. 586 , 82 L.Ed. 845 (1937) (‘[T]he sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith.”).
. See Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676 , 682-83 & n. 8 (9th Cir.2006); Singer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 375-77 (9th Cir.1997); Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 401-03 (9th Cir.1996); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting Garza v. Bettcher Indus., Inc., 752 F.Supp. 753, 763 (E.D.Mich.1990)); see also 14 C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3725 at 67 et seq. (collecting cases).
. Galt G/S v. JSS Scandinavia, 142 F.3d 1150, 1155-56 (9th Cir.1998).
. See O.R.S. 652.140, 653.010(11)
. See O.R.S. 652.200(2), 653.055(4).
. See Galt G/S v. JSS Scandinavia, 142 F.3d 1150, 1155-56 (9th Cir.1998).
. See Singer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.Co., 116 F.3d 373, 376-77 (9th Cir.1997).
. At oral argument, plaintiff's counsel did indeed make some remarks that sounded as though her total demand including attorneys’ fees was under $5 million, as the majority opinion says at page 2821. I understood her also to make remarks avoiding any commitment to that position. She appeared to me to be arguing and to be avoiding making a formal admission. She did not file any paper, in district court or this court, making such an admission.
. Majority at 998.
. 28U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
. Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 682-83 (9th Cir.2006) (emphasis added); see also Singer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 376 (9th Cir.1997) ("Where the complaint does not demand a dollar amount, the removing defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy [meets the jurisdictional minimum].”).
. See Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 690 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting Singer v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 374, 377 (9th Cir.1997)).
. See Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676 , 682-83 & n. 8 (9th Cir.2006).