explaining that “the general rule” is “that the degree of success does not bear on the threshold question of eligibility for an attorney’s fees award”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “the general rule” is “that the degree of success does not bear on the threshold question of eligibility for an attorney’s fees award”
- finding no abuse of 6 discretion where OAH and the district court awarded compensatory education service 7 to student in the form of additional training to his teachers
- prevailing parties “succeeded on several significant issues and achieved 13 much of the benefit they sought in exercising their rights to a due process hearing and to 14 bring a civil suit”
- finding no abuse of 16 discretion to award teacher training designed to compensate student by better training 17 his teachers to meet his particular needs
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BEEZER, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act provides that “[i]n any proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (i)(3)(B). 1 In accordance with the opinion of the court, I emphasize that “[i]t remains for the district court to determine what fee is ‘reasonable.’ ” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 , 103 S.Ct. 1933 , 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (emphasis added); see also Wilcox v. City of Reno, 42 F.3d 550, 554 (9th Cir.1994) (“Farrar [v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 , 113 S.Ct. 566 , 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992)] teaches that district courts, in the exercise of their discretion, should consider the extent of success in calculating a fee award.”)
Prevailing party status does not guarantee the receipt of attorney’s fees. The district court first “considers] the amount and nature of damages awarded.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115 , 113 S.Ct. 566 . “[T]he most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained])] ... the amount of damages awarded as compared to the amount sought.” Id. at 114 , 113 S.Ct. 566 ; see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 439-40 , 103 S.Ct. 1933 (“We emphasize that the inquiry does not end with a finding that the plaintiff obtained significant relief. A reduced fee award is appropriate if the relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole.”). “When a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim ... the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115 , 113 S.Ct. 566 (internal citation omitted). “When the plaintiffs success is purely technical or de minimis, no fees can be awarded.” Id. at 117 , 113 S.Ct. 566 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Where the prevailing party’s success is partial or limited, it is within the discretion of the district court to award limited fees. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436 , 103 S.Ct. 1933 . “If ... a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success, the product of hours reasonably expended on the litiga *1038 tion as a whole times a reasonable hourly-rate may be an excessive amount. This will be true even where the plaintiffs claims were interrelated, nonfrivolous, and raised in good faith.” Id. Once the district court has “considered the amount and nature of damages awarded, the court may lawfully award low fees or no fees without reciting the 12 factors bearing on reasonableness ... or multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115 , 113 S.Ct. 566 (internal citations and quotation omitted).
If consideration of the amount and nature of damages awarded does not yield a clear fee determination, “[t]he most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 , 103 S.Ct. 1933 . The district court may then “adjust the fee upward or downward” on the basis of “other considerations” including results obtained. Id. at 434 , 103 S.Ct. 1933 . Results obtained can be measured by examining: “First, did the plaintiff fail to prevail on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded? Second, did the plaintiff achieve a level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award?” Id. Additional factors may include the time and labor required; the novelty and difficulty of the questions- involved; the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; the customary fee; whether the fee is fixed or contingent; time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys; the undesirability of the case; the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client and awards in similar cases. Id. at 434 & n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ; see also Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359 , 363-64 & n. 8 (9th Cir.1996).
As the Supreme Court held in Hensley v. Eckerhart:
Where the plaintiff has failed to prevail on a claim that is distinct in all respects from his successful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful claim should be excluded in considering the amount of a reasonable fee. Where a lawsuit consists of related claims, a plaintiff who has won substantial relief should not have his attorney’s fee reduced simply because the district court did not adopt each contention raised. But where the plaintiff achieved only limited success, the district court should award only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained. On remand the District Court should determine the proper amount of the attorney’s fee award in light of these standards.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440 , 103 S.Ct. 1933 .
. The cited language is that of the statute in force at the time period in dispute (2001-2002). The language of the current attorneys' fee provision is almost identical. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (i)(3)(B).