stating that Rule 15(a) is a “liberal rule giv[ing] effect to the federal policy in favor of resolving cases on their merits instead of disposing of them on technicalities,” that “leave to amend a pleading should be denied only when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment would have been futile,” and that “[d]elay alone . . . is an insufficient reason to deny the plaintiff’s motion to amend.” (citation modified)
How later courts described this case
- stating that Rule 15(a) is a “liberal rule giv[ing] effect to the federal policy in favor of resolving cases on their merits instead of disposing of them on technicalities,” that “leave to amend a pleading should be denied only when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment would have been futile,” and that “[d]elay alone . . . is an insufficient reason to deny the plaintiff’s motion to amend.” (citation modified)
- concluding that the 90-day time limit set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) is not a jurisdictional requirement
- holding that a defendant’s argument relying on a similar 90-day filing deadline applicable to aggrieved federal employees was “in the nature of a statute-of-limitations defense”
- explaining that private-sector employees have the right to a de novo consideration of their employment discrimination claims without requiring the district courts to give deference to a finding by the EEOC of no reasonable cause
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WIDENER, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority holding that permits the plaintiff to assért, or to amend his complaint to again assert, his claim of religious discrimination, he having previously and successfully prosecuted the same and accepted the administrative award. I agree with the district court that it was without subject matter jurisdiction as to this aspect of the case. Laber had his day in court at least when he accepted the administrative award.
I concur in the majority decision to overrule the Pecker and Morris cases.
I concur in the majority decision affirming the grant of summary judgment to the defendant on plaintiffs claims of age discrimination and retaliation.