explaining that “a Rule 26(B) application to reopen is a collateral matter rather than part of direct review,” and “[a]s such, there is no federal constitutional right to assistance of counsel at that stage”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “a Rule 26(B) application to reopen is a collateral matter rather than part of direct review,” and “[a]s such, there is no federal constitutional right to assistance of counsel at that stage”
- holding that a motion to reopen is “part of the collateral, postconviction process rather than direct review” such that no constitutional right to counsel exists at that stage
- saying a Rule 26(B) application is a post-conviction procedure and not part of the direct review process that tolls the statute of limitations
- holding that a motion to reopen under Ohio R. App. P. 26(B) is a collateral proceeding
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ROGERS, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the judgment. I also concur in the majority opinion, with one qualification. It is unnecessary to conclude that our court’s decisions in Isham, Bronaugh, *360 and Searcy were in direct conflict with White v. Schotten, and I would not do so. While there is clearly some tension between the reasoning of White and that of our later statute of limitations cases, White’s characterization of Rule 26(B) for purposes of the constitutional right to counsel did not necessarily govern the different issue of how Rule 26(B) should be characterized for purposes of the AEDPA statute of limitations.