Opinion

Ireneo P. Parrilla v. Alberto R. Gonzales , Attorney General

  • 414 F.3d 1038
  • 2005 WL 1606506
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Jul 11, 2005
Status
Published
Author
Fernandez
On the bench
Fernandez, Tashima, Gould
Cited by
123 cases
Authority
More cited than 26.3%

concluding that petitioner “explic- itly incorporat[ed] the CDPC into his guilty plea” by stating that he understood that the court would review the CDPC in determining whether there was a factual basis for his plea

How later courts described this case

  • concluding that petitioner “explic- itly incorporat[ed] the CDPC into his guilty plea” by stating that he understood that the court would review the CDPC in determining whether there was a factual basis for his plea
  • holding that documents may be considered under the modified categorical approach “if specifically incorporated into the guilty plea or admitted by a defendant”
  • providing that “[a]n information and a guilty plea, considered together, are generally sufficient” under the modified categorical approach to determine whether the defendant was in fact convicted of a qualifying offense
  • applying Taylor in determining whether an alien’s state law conviction for child molestation constituted an aggravated felony under the INA such that the alien was ineligible for cancellation of removal

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge,

concurring and dissenting:

In my view, Washington Revised Code § 9.68A.090 categorically prohibited sexual *1045 abuse of a minor within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43)(A). That is, in my opinion, the Washington courts have placed a sufficiently narrowing construction on what might otherwise have been an overbroad statute for our purposes. See State v. McNallie, 120 Wash.2d 925 , 846 P.2d 1358, 1364 (1993); State v. Wissing, 66 Wash.App. 745 , 833 P.2d 424, 429 (1992); State v. Luther, 65 Wash.App. 424 , 830 P.2d 674, 675-76 (1992).

In addition, because, as the above cases indicate, Washington law requires that communication be for the purpose of actually involving a child in sexual misconduct, I do not believe that giving information about an abortion, unlawful or not, or making pornographic photography visible to the public, or allowing entry to an erotic performance business comes' within the meaning of communication with a minor for immoral purposes.

Thus, I do not agree with parts II A and B of the majority opinion, and dissent in that respect. However, I do concur in the remainder of the opinion and in the result.

Therefore, with the exception noted, I concur in the excellent majority opinion.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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