Opinion

United States v. George R. Blick

  • 408 F.3d 162
  • 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 9742
  • 2005 WL 1252617
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Filed
May 27, 2005
Status
Published
Author
Michael
On the bench
Michael, Shedd, Hamilton
Cited by
729 cases
Authority
More cited than 26.3%

holding that plea agreement waiver of right to appeal that district court accepted prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), was not invalidated by change in law effected by that decision

How later courts described this case

  • holding that plea agreement waiver of right to appeal that district court accepted prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), was not invalidated by change in law effected by that decision
  • holding that waiver of right to appeal in plea agreement entered into before United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), was not invalidated by change in law effected by that case and that Booker error fell within scope of waiver
  • holding that plea agreement waiver of right to appeal that district court accepted prior to Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), was not invalidated by change in law effected by that decision
  • holding that plea agreement waiver of right to appeal that district court accepted prior to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), was not invalidated by change in law effected by that decision

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

MICHAEL, Circuit Judge,

dissenting.

Under his plea agreement with the government, George Blick pled guilty to one count of wire fraud and waived his right to appeal. The district court made findings of fact under the then-mandatory sentencing guidelines and sentenced Blick to thirty months in prison. Because Blick could not have received this sentence based solely on the facts he admitted in the plea .agreement, the sentence was imposed in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. See United States v. Booker, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 738 , 160 LEd.2d 621 *174 (2005). The majority holds that Blick’s appeal waiver precludes him from challenging his unconstitutional sentence. I respectfully dissent because a defendant in this circuit cannot prospectively waive the right to appeal constitutional violations at sentencing. See United States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727 (4th Cir.1994).

I.

Blick was a one-third owner and CEO of Enterprise Integration, Inc. (Eli), an information systems consulting firm. In early 2003 Blick was conned by a man claiming to be a Nigerian official who could, with some help from Blick, embezzle $20.5 million from the Nigerian government in connection with a government contract. The man promised to share the booty with Blick if Blick (1) would advance monies necessary to facilitate the scheme and (2) allow one of his companies to be designated as “the rightful recipient of the money.” J.A. 96. Blick wired over $2,000,000 to the con artist, funding the advances in large part with unauthorized withdrawals from Ell’s bank account. Blick repaid some of the money, but by October 2003 so much was missing that Eli was in danger of not making payroll. Blick then informed his co-owners about his unauthorized withdrawals, and his co-owners contacted the authorities. On January 6, 2004, Blick was indicted on seven counts of wire fraud. Blick ultimately entered into a written plea agreement with the government and pled guilty to one count. The government agreed to dismiss the remaining counts. The plea agreement included the following appeal waiver: “the defendant knowingly waives the right to appeal the conviction and any sentence within the maximum provided in the statute of conviction (or the manner in which that sentence was determined) ... on any ground whatsoever, in exchange for the concessions made by the United States in this plea agreement.” J.A. 34-35.

On June 6, 2004, after Blick pled guilty but before he was sentenced, the Supreme Court decided Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), which cast doubt on the constitutionality of the sentencing guidelines. At sentencing the district court made a factual finding that Blick’s actions resulted in a loss of $655,000 to Eli and added fourteen levels to Blick’s base offense level under the guidelines. With the fourteen-level enhancement and other adjustments taken into account, the sentencing range was thirty to thirty-seven months. Without the fourteen-level enhancement, the sentencing range would have been zero to six months. Blick received a thirty-month sentence. He objected to the enhancement on the grounds that the imposition of a sentence greater than the maximum authorized by the facts admitted in the plea agreement was a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights under Blakely . Blick also moved the court to stay execution of the judgment until the resolution of Booker , which was pending before the Supreme Court at the time of his sentencing. The district court denied Blick’s motions but told him that if the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker “affect[ed him],” the court would promptly entertain a motion to reconsider. J.A. 76. Blick filed an appeal to this court prior to the Supreme Court’s Booker decision. He argues in his supplemental brief that he is entitled to a remand for resentencing in light of Booker and United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir.2005). The government contends that the appeal waiver bars Blick’s appeal.

II.

In United States v. Attar we held that a defendant cannot “fairly be said to have *175 waived his right to appeal his sentence on the ground that the proceedings following entry of the guilty plea were conducted in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, for a defendant’s agreement to waive appellate review of his sentence is implicitly conditioned on the assumption that the proceedings following entry of the plea will be conducted in accordance with constitutional limitations.” 38 F.3d at 732 . We have also held that an appeal waiver “will not bar appeal of a sentence when the sentence was ... based on a constitutionally impermissible factor.... ” United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 399, 403 (4th Cir.2000); see also United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1147 (4th Cir.1995) (same), United States v. Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir.1992) (same). Bliek’s sentence was based on a “constitutionally impermissible factor,” that is, it was based on facts found by the district court in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Likewise, Bliek’s sentencing hearing was not “conducted in accordance with constitutional limitations” because judicial fact-finding that subjects a defendant to a sentence greater than that allowed by the plea bargain or jury verdict alone is unconstitutional. Accordingly, Attar and Brown prevent a defendant from prospectively waiving his right to challenge an unconstitutional sentence or sentencing procedure.

Attar’s rule against prospective waiver of the right to appeal constitutional violations at sentencing is consistent with the general rule that circumscribes the waiver of constitutional rights. “The relevant principle is well established: a promise [to waive a constitutional right] is unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy harmed by enforcement of the agreement.” Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 , 107 S.Ct. 1187 , 94 L.Ed.2d 405 (1987); see also id. at 392 n. 2, 107 S.Ct. 1187 . The public policy behind the jury trial right applied in Booker is the centuries-old policy of “guard[ing] against a .spirit- of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers” and governments. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 753 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000)). This public policy is harmed when enforcement of an appeal waiver agreement results in an un-remedied violation of the jury trial right, a “constitutional [right] o'f surpassing importance.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 . This harm outweighs the interest in enforcing the agreement.

It is true that a defendant may waive constitutional rights as part of his decision to forego a trial. In that context, however, waiver or “[r]elinquishment derives ... from the admissions necessarily made upon entry of a voluntary plea of guilty.” United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573-74 , 109 S.Ct. 757 , 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989) (emphasis added). Thus, the waiver of trial rights in a plea proceeding does not create the same risk of unremedied constitutional violations that exists when a defendant waives the right to appeal from a proceeding that has not yet taken place. For example, although a defendant waives his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by entering into a plea agreement, his Sixth Amendment rights are not violated in the plea proceeding. Similarly, if a defendant decides not to challenge the validity of a search or a confession before entering into a plea agreement, it is presumed that he has determined either that his rights were not violated and a challenge would be pointless or that the suppression of evidence would not significantly help his case on the merits. In other words, “[a] plea of guilty and the ensuing conviction comprehend all of the factual and legal elements necessary to sustain a binding, final judgment of guilt....” Id. at *176 569 , 109 S.Ct. 757 . Although trial rights are waived, a defendant’s own admissions ensure the reliability of the conviction and protect against the dangers of unremedied constitutional violations.

By contrast, appeal waivers are not based on a defendant’s admission of guilt. In the context of an appeal waiver, the defendant agrees not to appeal a sentencing court’s factual, statutory, or constitutional rulings before they have even been made (presumably in exchange for a concession by the government). Thus, the defendant’s agreement provides no assurance that the court’s subsequent determinations will be correct or that the sentence or sentencing procedures will be constitutional. We generally permit defendants to waive their right to appeal factual and legal determinations at sentencing in the interest of finality, see United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53-54 (4th Cir.1990), but Attar establishes that some limits are required. The waiver of the right to appeal errors in a proceeding that has yet to occur presents a substantial risk of unrem-edied constitutional violations that would “impair[ ] to an appreciable extent ... the policies behind the rights involved.” Town of Newton, 480 U.S. at 392 , 107 S.Ct. 1187 n. 2 . For this reason, Attar wisely held that the waiver of appellate review “is implicitly conditioned on the assumption that the proceedings following entry of the plea will be conducted in accordance with constitutional limitations.” 38 F.3d at 732 .

The majority concludes that Attar does not require us to consider Blick’s constitutional claim because that decision only prevents a defendant from waiving the right to appeal constitutional errors that are not “reasonably contemplated when the plea agreement ][was] executed” or are “not part of the bargain [the defendant] struck with the United States.” Ante at 172-73. Nothing in Attar , however, suggests that the rule precluding waiver of the right to appeal an unconstitutional sentence is limited to only unforeseen constitutional violations. Nevertheless, the majority appears to be saying that a defendant can subject himself to constitutional violations at sentencing so long as they are reasonably contemplated by the plea agreement. Under this approach, for example, a defendant could be sentenced without the assistance of counsel (or even pro se representation) if he consented to that in the plea agreement. Not only is this prospect disturbing, it violates the public policy behind the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

The majority’s analysis ignores a fundamental point: the rule in Attar and Brown serves to place certain limits on the rights the government can demand that a defendant waive, regardless of the literal terms of the waiver agreement. The rule that an appeal waiver is conditioned on a constitutional sentencing proceeding is based on the principle that “a defendant who waives his right to appeal does not subject himself to being sentenced entirely at the whim of the district’ court.” Marin, 961 F.2d at 496 . Even a defendant who signs a blanket appeal waiver “retains the right to obtain appellate review of his sentence on certain limited grounds.” Attar, 38 F.3d at 732 .

I agree with the majority that Blick’s decision to enter into the plea agreement was not rendered unknowing or involuntary because of Booker . “[A] voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the then applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the [decision to enter into the] plea rested on a faulty premise.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). Under this rule a defendant may not rely on changes in the law to mount, an attack on the validity of his guilty plea. *177 This principle has led every other circuit that has addressed the issue to conclude that a defendant may waive his right to appeal a Booker error. See ante at 170-71 (collecting cases). In this circuit, however, we must abide by Attar , which holds that a defendant cannot prospectively waive the right to appeal constitutional violations at sentencing, even when the waiver is knowing and voluntary. Thus, while I agree that Booker does not render Blick’s decision to enter into a plea agreement involuntary, under Attar his appeal waiver was “implicitly conditioned on the assumption that the [sentencing] proceedings following entry of [his] plea [would] be conducted in accordance with constitutional limitations.” 38 F.3d at 732 . Because Blick’s sentence was enhanced by judge-found facts under a then-mandatory sentencing scheme, his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment.

The government points out that it made concessions to Blick (dropping six counts, for example) in exchange for his agreement to waive his appeal rights. Accordingly, the government argues that it would be denied the benefit of its bargain if Blick is resentenced on the one count. This is a valid point. Still, Blick’s unconstitutional sentence cannot stand. I would therefore vacate the sentence and accord the government the option on remand to withdraw from the plea agreement. If the government withdrew from the plea agreement, both the agreement and Blick’s guilty plea would be void. The parties would then start over with the seven-count indictment.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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