relying on decisions by “a wide array of lower courts” to conclude that the Supreme Court had “clearly stated that indicia of guilt such as shackles harm a defendant’s presumption of innocence”
How later courts described this case
- relying on decisions by “a wide array of lower courts” to conclude that the Supreme Court had “clearly stated that indicia of guilt such as shackles harm a defendant’s presumption of innocence”
- “the ‘unreasonable’ requirement is a high bar”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SILER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, for I believe that the Michigan Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, when it affirmed Ruimveld’s conviction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d).
I am in basic agreement with the majority in finding that if there was a constitutional error in this case, it is subject to a harmless error test. However, I differ on the question of whether there is clearly established federal law determined by the Supreme Court that trying a defendant in shackles is unconstitutional. Some dicta suggest such a result, as the majority relates, but I do not think it has been “clearly established.” See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 , 120 S.Ct. 1495 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (clearly established law “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this [Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.”). However, I would leave to another day the determination as to whether the law has been clearly established, for this case can be determined on the issue of whether, assuming there was a constitutional error, the resolution by the Michigan Court of Appeals in this matter was an unreasonable application of that law.
The majority correctly decides that the harmless error test by the Michigan Court of Appeals was the appropriate procedure after finding error by the trial court. 1 But then, the majority finds fault with how the Michigan Court of Appeals determined the error to be harmless. The majority says the state court did not find there to be “overwhelming evidence” against Ruim-veld, but it found that there was sufficient evidence for a conviction, and the district court found “there was ample evidence” to convict Ruimveld beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority also criticizes the Michigan Court of Appeals because it did not examine whether other prisoner witnesses, and specifically Billy Sirrene, ap *1019 peared before the jury in shackles. However, in the same language the trial court used in administering the oath for Ruim-veld to testify, as stated by the majority herein (“Sir, to the extent you can, would you raise your right hand for me?”), it also swore in other inmate witnesses, including Sirrene, James Ingram, Mark Anthony Collingwood, Larry Darnell Schuler and Gerald Hoskins. Therefore, the record was clear that other inmates who testified were also in shackles. The Michigan Court did not need to make a finding about that fact.
The majority also criticizes the Michigan Court for not looking at the totality of the evidence in determining harmlessness. It says that the evidence was “merely circumstantial.” Yet we know that “[c]ir-cumstantial evidence ... is intrinsically no different from testimonial evidence.” Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 , 75 S.Ct. 127 , 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954). Accord United States v. Frost, 914 F.2d 756, 762 (6th Cir.1990). Only two inmates, Ruim-veld and Sirrene, had possession of the cleaning solution that apparently was put into the coffee that Corrections Officer Snyder drank. Two witnesses saw Ruim-veld enter the break room within minutes of the time that Snyder drank the coffee. No one testified that Sirrene or any other inmate entered the break room around that time. Circumstantial? Yes, but it was “ample” to sustain the conviction.
The majority also criticizes the “cursory harmless error analysis” by the Michigan court, but Ruimveld’s shackling was discussed in two full paragraphs in the opinion. The quality of the ruling was never meant to depend upon the verbiage in the state court’s decision, or else Congress would have included such criteria in AED-PA. The majority also suggests that because the jury deliberated for three hours and asked questions of the court, this somehow shows that the shackling was prejudicial, but the Supreme Court has not yet held that such jury conduct illustrates prejudice. It means nothing. If anything, a short deliberation along with no inquiries to the court might suggest that the jury had made up its mind quickly because of the shacMes.
It was never meant for this court to be a super appellate court to the Michigan Court of Appeals. See Payne v. Janasz, 711 F.2d 1305, 1310 (6th Cir.1983). That is the job of the Michigan Supreme Court, which declined to hear the case. I would deny the writ, finding the Michigan Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply clearly established law as determined by the United States Supreme Court.
. The majority relates that the Michigan Court of Appeals “clearly found” constitutional error, but I failed to discover where that occurs in the opinion. Instead, the court found error, cited only Michigan state cases, and concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Ruimveld to remain shackled during the trial.