holding that “the asylum officer’s Assessment To Refer [wa]s not sufficient evidence of what Singh said to permit evaluation of an asserted conflict” with Singh’s later testimony where the Assessment to Refer, inter alia, “d[id] not contain any record of the questions and answers at the asylum interview, or other detailed, contemporary, chronological notes of the interview, but only a short, conclusory summary — essentially, an opinion”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “the asylum officer’s Assessment To Refer [wa]s not sufficient evidence of what Singh said to permit evaluation of an asserted conflict” with Singh’s later testimony where the Assessment to Refer, inter alia, “d[id] not contain any record of the questions and answers at the asylum interview, or other detailed, contemporary, chronological notes of the interview, but only a short, conclusory summary — essentially, an opinion”
- holding that an asylum officer’s report did not constitute substantial evidence to support an adverse credibility finding where, inter alia, there was no indication that the interview was conducted under oath or that petitioner had an opportunity to comment on the evidence at the end of the interview, the asylum officer did not testify, and the reliability of the report was insufficiently supported by the record
- holding that petitioner’s answers during asylum interview do not provide substantial evidence to support the IJ’s adverse credibility finding where the petitioner was not given an opportunity to explain inconsistencies, there was no transcript of the interview, and there was no indication that *503 the petitioner’s testimony during the interview was under oath
- explaining that, because of the informal nature of the asylum interview, discrepancies between the asylum officer’s assessment and an applicant’s testimony before the IJ, without more, is not substantial evidence supporting an adverse credibility determination
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LEAVY, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result. The adverse credibility determination is not supported by substantial evidence.
This circuit has articulated a rule of law that “Minor inconsistencies in the record that do not relate to the basis of an applicant’s alleged fear of persecution, go to the heart of the asylum claim, or reveal anything about an asylum applicant’s fear for his safety are insufficient to support an adverse credibility finding.” Mendoza Manimbao v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 655, 660 *1094 (9th Cir.2003). The several citations to medical and psychological journals that discuss the scientific explanations for lapses in date recall, none of which are in the record, suggest that our appellate decision is premised on factfinding that has not been tested by the adversarial process. Furthermore, the opinion incorrectly suggests that an inaccurate process of date recollection is the reason underlying our “minor discrepancy” jurisprudence. I would find it sufficient to rely upon our well-established precedent. By engaging in our own factfinding, we invite another court, or even an administrative body, to reject our holding as precedent, if, in its superior factfinding process, it finds that we are wrong on the facts.