holding that Indian status is an affirmative defense to a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1152 , and that once the burden of production is satisfied, the gov- ernment retains the ultimate burden of persuasion
How later courts described this case
- holding that Indian status is an affirmative defense to a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1152 , and that once the burden of production is satisfied, the gov- ernment retains the ultimate burden of persuasion
- concluding that it was significant that a tribal court had exercised jurisdiction over the defendant because “the tribe has no jurisdiction to punish anyone but an Indian”
- stating that evidence of federal recognition is not required and emphasizing that the question is whether there is some evidence of federal or tribal recognition
- noting that the second prong requires a “non-racial link” to a tribe
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RYMER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I part company because until now, no one has ever held that an adult may be an Indian (for purposes of legal status, not for purposes of ethnicity) when she is neither enrolled as a member of a tribe nor eligible for membership, nor entitled to tribal or government benefits to which only Indians are entitled; our law does not require us to allow Bruce to put her legal status as an Indian into play — and thus to shift the burden to the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she is not an Indian — in the absence of any evidence that she is at least eligible for tribal membership or recognition; and it makes no sense to do so, for the majority’s contrary rule allows Bruce, on the same set of facts, to be both an Indian (who cannot be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1152 ) and not an Indian (who cannot be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1153 ).
The facts are undisputed. The evidence shows that:
• Bruce’s mother, who is enrolled in the Turtle Mountain Tribe, is Indian
• Bruce is one-eighth Chippewa
• Bruce currently lives on the reservation of the Fort Peck Tribe
• Bruce associates with Indian persons
• Bruce has three children, two of whom are Indian and are enrolled in a tribe
• Bruce engaged in one sweat lodge (a ceremony that has religious significance)
*1232 • Bruce was “arrested tribal all her life” 1
There is no evidence:
• that Bruce is an enrolled member of any tribe
• that Bruce is recognized as a tribe member by any tribe or the federal government
• that Bruce enjoys any benefits of tribal affiliation
• that Bruce is eligible for tribal membership
• that Bruce, has voted in tribal elections, that she has held tribal office, that she has served on tribal juries, that she has received payments or allotments made only to Indians, or that she is employed by a tribal organization.
I agree with the district court that, as a matter of law, this evidence does not permit a jury to find that Bruce has legal status as an Indian.
The Federal Enclave Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 , provides for the prosecution of crimes committed in Indian country by non-Indians against Indians, but its coverage does not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian; § 1153, in turn, provides that an Indian who commits certain major crimes against the person or property of another Indian may be prosecuted under the general laws of the United States. Neither section defines “Indian.” However, courts generally follow the Rogers test, 2 which considers “(1) the degree of Indian blood; and (2) tribal or government recognition as an Indian.” United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir.1996). We have held that the defendant’s legal status as a non-Indian is not an element or an essential jurisdictional fact that must be charged in an indictment under § 1152. United States v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir.1983). Rather, as we explained in adopting the burden-shifting framework that controls § 1152 prosecutions and this case,
[i]t is far more manageable for the defendant to shoulder the burden of producing evidence that he is a member of a federally recognized tribe than it is for the Government to produce evidence that he is not a member of any one of the hundreds of such tribes. We accordingly hold that the Government need not allege the non-Indian status of the defendant in an indictment under section 1152, nor does it have the burden of going forward on that issue. Once the defendant properly raises the issue of his Indian status, then the ultimate burden of proof remains, of course, upon the Government.
Id. at 1043 (emphasis added).
While we have stated in different contexts that enrollment is not the exclusive way to show that one is Indian, 3 we have *1233 recognized that tribal membership is the common thread and evidentiary means of establishing Indian status. See Broncheau, 597 F.2d at 1263(observing this, and noting that the defendant admitted he was enrolled and never suggested he did not understand the term “Indian” as it applied to him). So far as I can tell, no court has ever held that an adult could have Indian legal status who was neither enrolled or eligible for enrollment, nor entitled to tribal or government benefits due only to Indians. 4 Indeed, enrollment — or at a mini *1234 mum, eligibility -for enrollment — may be constitutionally required to avoid equal protection problems because otherwise, enforcement of federal criminal laws would arguably be based on an impermissible racial classification. See Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646, 97 S.Ct. 1395 (holding that there was no constitutional problem because defendants were not subjected to federal criminal jurisdiction under § 1153 on account of their Indian race, but because they are enrolled members of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe); Keys, 103 F.3d at 761 (noting that Antelope had upheld prosecution on equal protection grounds because “the term ‘Indian’ describes a political group or membership, not a racial group”).
It is difficult to fathom what the “recognition” prong of Rogers means if not enrollment or eligibility for enrollment in a tribe, or receipt of tribal or federal benefits to which only Indians are entitled. Indian ties cannot be enough, because one can have ties -without legal status. As the Supreme Court observed in Duro v. Reina, “[m]any‘non-Indians reside on reservations, and have close ties to tribes through marriage or long employment. Indeed, the population of non-Indians on reservations generally is greater than the population of all Indians, ...” 495 U.S. 676, 695 , 110 S.Ct. 2053 , 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990).
But if — as the majority holds — ties are enough for purposes of §. 1152, no reason of logic, linguistics, or grammar suggests that ties should not also be enough for purposes of § 1153. 5 Yet clearly they are not. To the contrary, we have held for purposes of § 1153 that a terminated Kla-math Indian is no longer an Indian because she lost her Indian legal status upon termination. United States v. Heath, 509 F.2d 16, 19 (9th Cir.1974); Hester, 719 F.2d at 1043 n. 2 (so noting). If that is so, then it makes no sense for an Indian who has never had tribal membership and is ineligible for it to have legal status as an Indian. A court cannot rationally hold that both things are true.
United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758 (9th Cir.1996), which the majority points to as “instructive,” op. at 1225, is different. There, the question of Indian, status arose with respect to a two-year old girl who was not enrolled in the Tribe. However, we decided that her lack of enrollment did not control the determination of her. Indian status because she could not have enrolled herself, her mother was an enrolled member of the Colorado River Indian Tribe, the girl had one-quarter Colorado River Indian blood, the girl’s custody was litigated in the Colorado River Indian Tribal Court which exercised jurisdiction over her and continued to do so at the time of the *1235 federal action, and the allegations that formed the gravamen of the federal prosecution were investigated by Colorado River Indian police. Id. at 761 . Bruce’s situation differs because she is an adult who could have enrolled herself (if she were eligible), she has one-eighth Chippewa blood (which is not the bloodline of the Ford Peck tribes), and she was not under the jurisdiction of any tribal court at the time of the federal action.
In sum, the district court got the test right, correctly construed the facts in the light most favorable to Bruce, and concluded that, as a matter of law, the evidence adduced by Bruce does not permit a reasonable inference that she has Indian legal status. Applying the Rogers test, the district court acknowledged evidence of some Indian blood possessed by Bruce. This evidence shows that she is one-eighth Chippewa, but there is no evidence that this meets the quantum of blood requirement for recognition by that tribe. As Judge Canby notes in his Nutshell, tribes have different blood requirements for enrollment; many require one-fourth tribal blood, and at least one requires five-eighths. 6 William C. Canby, Jr., American Indian Law in a Nutshell 10 (4th ed.2003). Regardless, there is no evidence that Bruce is enrolled as a member of the Turtle Mountain Tribe — where her mother is enrolled — or of the Sioux or Assiniboine tribes which are the two tribes at Ford Peck, where Bruce now lives, or of any Chippewa tribe. There is no evidence that she is eligible for membership. There is no evidence that Bruce holds herself out as Indian; although she enrolled two of her three children, she has not enrolled (or for all that appears, ever tried to enroll) herself.
This indicates that she either knows that she cannot be a tribal member, or does not wish to identify herself as one. There is no evidence that she has received benefits, payments, or allotments to which only an Indian is entitled. Nor is there any evidence that Bruce has taken part in tribal affairs by voting, serving on juries, or holding office. There is no evidence that Fort Peck has been involved in her life in a significant enough way to constitute recognition; and conversely, visiting a sweat lodge with her mother on one occasion does not manifest participation in Indian life or heritage to any substantial extent. The only evidence of Bruce’s legal status as an Indian comes from the fact that her mother is an enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Tribe, Bruce was “arrested tribal,” was married for a time to an Indian, has two enrolled children, lives on the Fort Peck reservation (which is home to tribes with which she has no blood relationship), and socializes with others on the reservation because of her children. This could well be true of a lot of people, for many non-Indians live on Indian reservations, where they too get in trouble, socialize with Indians, marry Indians, and have children who are recognized as Indian. These facts alone do not raise an inference that Bruce has been recognized by any tribe or the government.
Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that Bruce failed to produce sufficient evidence to support a finding that she has legal status as an Indian. I would not cut a new path that allows someone to *1236 have the legal status of an Indian, and not an Indian, on the same set of facts that does not include enrollment, eligibility for enrollment, or entitlement to Indian benefits as a common denominator. I therefore dissent.
.This is the only evidence in the record about Bruce's involvement with tribal authorities. Bruce (quite properly) does not rely on anything else. While the majority disclaims reliance on two arrests reported in the Presen-tence ■ Investigation Report, it nevertheless uses these incidents (both for disorderly con- ■ duct for which the disposition was "forfeit bail") and an argument made in a reply brief to bolster its position. Of course, neither was in evidence before the district court when it found that Bruce had not met her burden of production on the affirmative defense of her Indian status, and should not be considered for any purpose on appeal. Even so, these offenses show nothing pertinent because, for all we know, they are not even Bruce’s and we have no way of knowing whether tribal jurisdiction was contested or conceded.
. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 , 4 How. 567 , 11 L.Ed. 1105 (1846).
. See Keys, 103 F.3d at 761 (stating that lack of enrollment of two-year old who had been treated as member of the tribe by the tribe and her parents does not control determination of her Indian status); United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. *1233 1979) (upholding § 1153 indictment that charged defendant as an Indian against challenge that it was deficient for failing also to charge that he was enrolled as enrollment is not an "absolute requirement,” nor necessarily determinative, when the indictment adequately put the defendant on notice of his classification as an Indian); Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 Ariz. L.Rev. 503, 516 (1976). The Eighth Circuit, which considers the determination of Indian or non-Indian status a conclusion of law, has broken the test into four factors which are, in declining order of importance: "1) tribal enrollment; 2) government recognition formally and informally through receipt of assistance reserved only to Indians; 3) enjoyment of the benefits of tribal affiliation; and 4) social recognition as an Indian through residence on a reservation and participation in Indian social life.” United States v. Lawrence, 51 F.3d 150, 152 (8th Cir.1995); see also United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir.1984) (approving consideration of whether a person is recognized as an Indian by an Indian tribe, or by the federal government, and whether a person resides on an Indian reservation and holds himself out as an Indian).
. See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 , 97 S.Ct. 1395 , 51 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977) (noting that because § 1153 does not apply to many individuals who are racially to be classified as Indians, the government offered proof that the defendants are enrolled members of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe and thus not emancipated from tribal relations; declining to reach question whether nonenrolled Indians may ever be subject to § 1153); Lawrence, 51 F.3d at 152-54 (holding that alleged victim was non-Indian given that she was not an enrolled member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe or any other tribe and wasn’t eligible for enrollment because she had not completed the requirements for tribal enrollment; the medical services she had received from the Indian Health Service were not in her own right; the fact that the Oglala Sioux Tribe had taken custody and placed the victim under the care of her grandmother (an enrolled member) was too insignificant an involvement to show tribal recognition as the victim was not enrolled or eligible for enrollment; and she did not attend pow-wows, Indian dances or other Indian cultural events and lived off-reservation except for a brief period before she was abused); United States v. James, 980 F.2d 1314, 1319 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that facts conclusively proved that the defendant and victim were enrolled Indians within the meaning of § 1153); United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 786-87 (8th Cir.1976) (holding that evidence of having filed an application for enrollment in the Yurok Tribe and previous entry on the Pawnee tribal roll, and the fact that defendants had held themselves out to be Indians within the meaning of § 1153, established Indian status under § 1153); United States v. Heath, 509 F.2d 16, 19 (9th Cir.1974) (refusing to uphold federal jurisdiction over an individual who was anthropologically a Klamath Indian after the Termination Act ended his tribal affiliation); United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 953 (9th Cir.1974) (stating, in dicta, that enrollment or lack of it is not determinative of status as an Indian; the defendant had asked that his name be removed from the rolls of the Colville Tribe but it was not done); Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 30-32 (7th Cir.1938) (holding on habeas review of a state court conviction that petitioner was Indian even though the enrolling agent for the Bad River Reservation had refused to enroll him because he belonged to the Lost Band of St. Croix Chippewas — an action which didn’t show that the petitioner was not Indian but rather, was evidence that he was— and noting that he was the child of a full-blooded Indian of the St. Croix Band of Lake Superior Chippewas and a father who was a half-blood, had always resided on a reservation that was set aside by treaty for the La-Pointe Band and other Indians who might settle with them, he maintained tribal relations with the Indians on the reservation and was recognized as a Chippewa Indian by other Indians); Petition of Carmen, 165 F.Supp. 942, 948 (N.D.Cal.1958) (finding no doubt *1234 that petitioner is an Indian subject to the Major Crimes Act as he is an' Indian by blood and enrolled as a member of the Mono tribe), aff'd sub nom. Dickson v. Carmen, 270 F.2d 809 (9th Cir.1959); see also Halbert v. United States, 283 U.S. 753, 762-63 , 51 S.Ct. 615 , 75 L.Ed. 1389 (1931) (noting the general rule that the right of individual Indians to share in tribal property depends on tribal membership); Vezina v. United States, 245 F. 411 (8th Cir.1917) (holding that person who was by blood of the Fond du Lac band of the Chippewas of Lake Superior who moved to the reservation, was recognized, enrolled, and secured allotments upon the reservation were members).
. As we observed in United States v. Jackson, 600 F.2d 1283, 1285-86 (9th Cir.1979):
Section 1153 should be read in conjunction with § 1152, which extends “the general laws of the United States as to the punishment -of. offenses ... to the Indian country” with certain exceptions.... Thus, the general rule is that “except for the offenses enumerated in (section 1153), all crimes committed by enrolled Indians against other Indians within Indian country are subject to the jurisdiction of tribal courts.” United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 , 643 n. 2, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 1397, n. 2 , 51 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977).
. One circuit court (functioning as a trial court) found based on evidence of custom and prior enrollment that one-eighth blood was sufficient to be enrolled as a member of a particular tribe that the persons involved (who were of mixed Indian blood) had chosen to identify themselves with, and to be entitled to tribal benefits. Sully v. United States, 195 F. 113 (C.C.D.S.D.1912). Whether or not one-eighth blood is sufficient in some cases, there is no evidence in this case that it would suffice for purposes of membership in, or identification with, any relevant tribe.