finding that three-month lapse between filing of discrimination charge and termination of employment was “significant enough to constitute sufficient evidence of a causal connection” for purposes of the plaintiff’s prima facie case of Title VII retaliation
How later courts described this case
- finding that three-month lapse between filing of discrimination charge and termination of employment was “significant enough to constitute sufficient evidence of a causal connection” for purposes of the plaintiff’s prima facie case of Title VII retaliation
- explaining that “in discrimination and retaliation cases, an employer’s true motivations are particularly difficult to ascertain, . . . thereby frequently making such factual determinations unsuitable for disposition at the summary judgment stage”
- concluding that temporal proximity alone of three months “is significant enough to constitute *988 sufficient evidence of a causal connection for the purpose of satisfying [the plaintiff’s] burden of demonstrating a prima facie [retaliation] case”
- concluding that temporal proximity alone of three months “is significant enough to constitute sufficient evidence of a causal connection for the purpose of satisfying [the plaintiff’s] burden of demonstrating a prima facie [retaliation] case.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ROGERS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because in my view the district court properly granted summary judgment on the procedural due process claim, I respectfully dissent from Part III.A. of the majority opinion. “Due process is a flexible principle whose requirements depend on the facts of the individual case.” Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 743 (6th Cir.2000). Due process does not require that all bases for a final decision to terminate be part of an initial decision to suspend. Once an employee has been suspended without a due process violation, his property interest is lessened. His interest is not in staying employed, but in returning to work. “Termination” in this context is merely a formal date, as the employee is working neither before nor after that date. In such a context a “post-termination” hearing may well be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339-43 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); cf. Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 223-24 (6th Cir.1996). Indeed, it appears to be sufficient in this case. The suspension letter given to Singfield not only informs Singfield that he was being suspended for the unauthorized duplication of master keys and altercation with Reinhart, but also informs him that the Housing Authority had concerns regarding “several [other] altercations between you and your supervisors, as well as with fellow employees.” Singfield thus was “faced with charges that a reasonable person would recognize as jeopardizing an employment future.” Buckner v. City of Highland Park, 901 F.2d 491, 495-96 (6th Cir.1990). The process Singfield received therefore satisfies the flexible requirements of procedural due process.
At the very least, qualified immunity is warranted for Mr. Reinhart on the due process issue. Even if due process should extend to requiring that validly suspended employees get the same “pre-termination” hearing that working employees get, there has been no demonstration that such a requirement is “clearly established.” See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).