holding that disputed issue of fact precluded summary judgment for officers in plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where plaintiff disputed offi- cers’ assertion that they could see handgun in his car while they were standing outside the vehicle, and thus permissibly entered vehicle to retrieve the firearm and then arrested plaintiff
How later courts described this case
- holding that disputed issue of fact precluded summary judgment for officers in plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where plaintiff disputed offi- cers’ assertion that they could see handgun in his car while they were standing outside the vehicle, and thus permissibly entered vehicle to retrieve the firearm and then arrested plaintiff
- explaining without deciding that “there seems to be no logical distinction between excessive force claims and denial of medical care claims when determining the applicability of the Fourth Amendment”
- holding that officers could lawfully search the interior of defendant’s vehicle if they “had lawfully detained [him], and they had grounds for reasonable suspicion that [he] had weapons in his car”
- explaining that a party needs to allege that a government actor lacked a rational basis to enforce law against one party eligible for enforcement but not another
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SILER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in all aspects of the majority’s opinion except on the alleged illegal search of Boone’s automobile. I also concur in the majority’s analysis of the applicability of Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 , 103 S.Ct. 3469 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). However, I take exception with the majority’s conclusion that there is an issue of fact on whether Darfus or Moyer could have seen the handgun in plain view when looking through the window of Boone’s vehicle. As the majority contends, Boone made sure that the pistol was still hidden at the time that he got out of his car. If the officers had looked through the window of the car while it was still located where Boone had left it in the street, there would have been an issue of fact as to whether an officer could have seen the pistol poking out from under the seat.
However, someone moved the car from the time that Boone got out of it in the street and the time Officers Moyer and Darfus looked through the car window and saw the firearm. There is a question concerning who moved the vehicle, but the parties at oral argument said that it was not material. Therefore, disregarding who moved the car, we must determine whether there is a dispute of the fact that Moyer and Darfus said that they could see the handgun poking out from under the seat when they looked through the car window after the car had been moved. Both of them said that they saw the pistol, and Boone can only say that when he left the vehicle in the street, the weapon was concealed, so no one could have seen it then. Like the district court, I would find that Boone failed to show there was a genuine issue of material fact “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Therefore, I would uphold the district court’s finding that there was no illegal search of the vehicle, because the firearm was observed in plain view by the officers. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983).