Opinion

United States v. Pedro Calderon-Pena

  • 383 F.3d 254
  • 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18036
  • 2004 WL 1888407
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Aug 24, 2004
Status
Published
Author
Garza
On the bench
King, Jolly, Higginbotham, Davis, Jones, Smith, Wiener, Barksdale, Garza, Demoss, Benavides, Stewart, Dennis, Clement, Prado, Pickering
Cited by
164 cases
Authority
More cited than 26.2%

Overruled in part, on other grounds by United States v. Fredis Reyes-Contreras, 910 F.3d 169 (2018)

holding that the offense of child endangerment was not a "crime of violence" under § 2L1.2 because child endangerment did not "have the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another as a required element."

How later courts described this case

  • holding that the offense of child endangerment was not a "crime of violence" under § 2L1.2 because child endangerment did not "have the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another as a required element."
  • holding that whenever a statute has alternative methods of commission, the court "may look to charging papers to see which of the various statutory alternatives are involved in the particular case"
  • stressing that “[a]s a matter of simple logic,” an endangerment offense requiring that the defendant “places a child younger than 15 years in imminent danger of ... bodily injury” “can—but need not—involve the application of physical force to the child’s person”
  • reasoning that a child-endangerment offense is not a crime of violence, because the offense does not require any bodily contact or awareness of danger

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Overruled in part, on other grounds by United States v. Fredis Reyes-Contreras, 910 F.3d 169 (2018)

    383 F.3d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Reyes-Contreras, 910 F.3d 169
    Court of Appeals for the Fifth CircuitNov 30, 20185 citing opinionsother groundsin partRead it

The opinion

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge,

dissenting:

I write separately because I agree with both the “use of force” analysis in Judge Smith’s dissent and with the interpretation of Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 , 110 S.Ct. 2143 , 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) in Judge Jones’s dissent. I do not agree with the portions of Judge Jones’s dissent that indicate that the majority opinion in United States v. Vargas-Duran, 356 F.3d 598 (5th Cir.2004) (en banc), is correct. For the reasons expressed in my dissent in Vargas-Duran , I continue to believe that Vargas-Duran was wrongly decided. See Vargas-Duran, 356 F.3d at 610 (Garza, J. dissenting).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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