recognizing that, in the context of an access-to-the-courts claim, "opportunities to correct mistakes before a suit reaches its conclusion means that there is no constitutional problem in the first place"
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that, in the context of an access-to-the-courts claim, "opportunities to correct mistakes before a suit reaches its conclusion means that there is no constitutional problem in the first place"
- clarifying that “errors of state law differ from offenses against the Constitution” and noting that having “opportunities to correct mistakes before a suit reaches its conclusion [in state court] means that there is no constitutional problem in the first place”
- writing that no claim for access to the courts was stated based upon the fact that the appellant could have appealed the clerk's refusal of his petition within the state system but failed to take advantage of the remedies available to him
- stating that the right of access “is protected by the First Amendment right to petition and the Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KANNE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join the Per Curiam opinion. However, I do agree with my colleague, Judge Ripple, that Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 , 122 S.Ct. 2179 , 153 L.Ed.2d 413 (2002) provides the template for the analysis of this case, and therefore find compelling a good portion of his separate opinion carefully laying out Christopher’s approach to determining whether a complaint states a right-to-aecess claim (see dissenting opinion, section I.A.) and applying Christopher to the matter before us (see id. at sections I.B. 1. and 2.). I also agree with Judge Ripple’s discussion of the distinction between Christopher and Parrott v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 , 101 S.Ct. 1908 , 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981) (see id. at section I.B. 3. a.).
Where Judge Ripple and I part company is in the application of the third prong of the Christopher test for determining whether Mr. Snyder’s second amended complaint states a right-to-access claim (see id. at section I.B. 3. b.). As Judge Ripple cogently explains, that third element requires Mr. Snyder to request a remedy awarded as recompense for the denial of access to the courts (and, hence, *294 the frustration of his underlying claim), but that remedy must not otherwise be available through other litigation. Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415 , 122 S.Ct. 2179 . Unlike Judge Ripple, I do not believe Mr. Snyder has met this threshold based on the facts of this case — facts that in salient respects mirror those of the unsuccessful plaintiff in Christopher .
Mr. Snyder sought, as relief in his underlying claim against his then-wife, a temporary restraining order preventing her from dissipating his assets allegedly covered by a valid prenuptial agreement. This form of relief — which seeks, at a specific moment in time, to stop the defendant’s adverse behavior — -is similar to the injunction sought by the plaintiff in Christopher . There, the plaintiff claimed that the relief she would have sought in the underlying action against the government, had she not been frustrated by its deceptive and misleading statements, was an injunction preventing her husband’s murder. Id. at 419 , 122 S.Ct. 2179 .
The Christopher Court recognized that the plaintiffs right-to-access claim, brought after her husband’s death, could not possibly provide her the relief she would have originally sought — an injunction stopping his murder. As the Court stated:
It is true that she cannot obtain in any present tort action the order she would have sought before her husband’s death, the order that might have saved her husband’s life. But neither can she obtain any such order on her access claim, which therefore cannot recompense [her] for the unique loss she claims as a consequence of her inability to bring an [ ] action earlier.
Id. at 421-22 , 122 S.Ct. 2179 . Because that time-sensitive opportunity was lost forever, all that remained to compensate the plaintiff for the alleged denial of access to the courts was primarily money damages. That, the Court determined, was available through other causes of action already pending against the government, thus eliminating any basis for a separate right-to-access claim. Id. at 422 , 122 S.Ct. 2179 .
Like the plaintiff in Christopher , Mr. Snyder claims he has lost the time-sensitive opportunity to prevent his former wife from dissipating his assets. That moment being gone, what he attempts to recover in his right-to-access suit is money damages equal to his lost property. Yet, the relief he now seeks on his federal constitutional access claim was obtainable in state court through other non-constitutional claims against his former wife, such as a suit for breach of the prenuptial agreement. Under such circumstances, where more than one avenue remained open for the recovery of monetary damages at the time of the filing of the constitutional access claim, Mr. Snyder was, ipso facto, not deprived of his constitutional right of access to the courts.
Although this case was disposed of in the district court on other grounds, the dismissal of Mr. Snyder’s second amended complaint was proper under the third prong of Christopher , as described above.