finding that a prisoner can demonstrate that a prison official disregarded a risk to prisoner safety through circumstantial evidence showing that the response to the risk was “patently inadequate”
How later courts described this case
- finding that a prisoner can demonstrate that a prison official disregarded a risk to prisoner safety through circumstantial evidence showing that the response to the risk was “patently inadequate”
- noting that deliberate indifference “is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence” (emphasis added
- analyzing a Fourteenth Amendment claim but using the same standard “as that which applies to cases arising under the Eighth Amendment, where prison officials are accused of deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to prison inmates,” Jd. at 302 n.11.
- holding that “a district court’s order denying a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity is a qualifying order under the collateral order doctrine and thus is reviewable immediately”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KING, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I agree that a violation of Lee’s constitutional rights has not been established by the evidence and that the police officers are entitled to qualified immunity; however, this is a close case. I write separately to emphasize my view that, taking the *312 facts in the light most favorable to Lee, the officers have skirted the precipice of deliberate indifference. The circumstances leading to Lee’s death are troubling: (1) Lee was intoxicated; (2) he was unable or unwilling to communicate his needs to the officers; (3) he could not stand up or walk on his own; and (4) he would not or could not spit the vomit from his mouth without being asked repeatedly to do so. And notwithstanding their subjective knowledge that Lee could vomit again, the officers placed the hood over his head and face, and they left him virtually unattended in the back of the police van for about thirty minutes. Although common sense indicates that the officers’ actions were inappropriate, those actions do not constitute the conscience-shocking behavior required for a constitutional deprivation. See Young v. City of Mount Ranter, 238 F.3d 567 , 574 (4th Cir.2001) (“Only governmental conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ is actionable as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 , 118 S.Ct. 1708 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998)). While the officers subjectively knew that Lee could vomit again, they were not deliberately indifferent to that risk. They took measures to ensure Lee’s safety: (1) they placed Lee in the van in the presence of a trained medical professional; (2) they placed Lee on his side in the back of the van; and (3) they tilted Lee’s head to ensure that, if he vomited, his airway would remain free.
In sum, although the officers’ actions may well constitute negligence, they do not meet the stringent standard of deliberate indifference. See Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir.1999) (“Deliberate indifference is a very high standard a showing of mere negligence will not meet it.”). And, as we have appropriately recognized, courts should not precipitously interfere with or seek to supervise the difficult decisions faced regularly by law enforcement officers. See id. at 696 (“To lower this [deliberate indifference] threshold would thrust federal courts into the daily practices of local police departments.”). Because the conduct complained of by Lee does not meet the “very high standard” of deliberate indifference, I concur — albeit reluctantly — in Judge Williams’s view that this appeal should be decided on that basis. As a result, I would, like Judge Williams, not reach the issue of whether the officers violated a “clearly established” constitutional right.
Consistent with the foregoing, I would recognize the officers’ claim of qualified immunity and reverse the district court.