recognizing that a prisoner does not have a property or liberty interest in prison employment under the due process clause
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that a prisoner does not have a property or liberty interest in prison employment under the due process clause
- stating that the plaintiff was not required to show discriminatory intent because the state admitted it considered race when it assigned inmates to a cell
- holding prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity if it was not clearly established that race-based differentiation is unconstitutional
- explaining that there is no due process property or liberty interest in prison employment
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge,
concurring..
I concur in Judge Kozinski’s opinion, with one exception. I do not join in part 2 of the Discussion.
Although I find that part of the Discussion very informative, in my opinion we should not decide qualified immunity issues in the first instance, but should leave them for the district court. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819-20 , 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2739 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707 (9th Cir.1991). I realize that we have, on occasion, succumbed to the temptation to swoop down from our coign of vantage and pluck qualified immunity issues from the district court battlefield, but in the long run I think we are better advised to resist that temptation. I, for one, do not think we should attempt to predict the nature or result of further proceedings in the district court, once it actually begins to vet the qualified immunity issues raised here.
Thus, I respectfully concur, but with the exception just noted.