holding, in the Ruby Ridge civil case, that the FBI’s directive to kill any armed adult male was constitutionally unreasonable even though a United States Marshal had already been shot and killed by one of the males
How later courts described this case
- holding, in the Ruby Ridge civil case, that the FBI’s directive to kill any armed adult male was constitutionally unreasonable even though a United States Marshal had already been shot and killed by one of the males
- noting that the plaintiff “ultimately pled guilty to [the] felony [of] . . . ‘driv[ing] his vehicle in a manner indicating a wanton or wilful disregard for the lives or property of others[,]’” but that shooting him violated the Fourth Amendment because it was “not clear that he ‘was engaged in the commission of a felony at the time of the occurrence causing the injury”
- relying on general statistics of the dangers of high-speed car chases was improper, given that the statistics were not supplied by the parties, or responded to by the party adversely affected; also noting the Supreme Court's rejection of this general statistical approach "to prove dangerousness in an individual case"
- explaining that the failure to discipline theory turned on an argument for subsequent ratification because the failure to discipline could not itself cause the already-completed misconduct
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I join fully in Judge Fletcher’s opinion for the court, on the understanding that officers may not use deadly force against an otherwise nondangerous felony suspect simply because a chase of that suspect, high-speed or otherwise, would become or does become dangerous. Rather, as I understand the controlling law, if a high-speed chase of a nondangerous felony suspect would be, or becomes, dangerous, the officers must terminate the chase. In other words, the chase itself cannot create the danger that justifies shooting a suspect who, under Gamer, may not otherwise be shot. I do not understand the out-of-eir-cuit cases discussed in Judge Fletcher’s excellent opinion and in the dissent to hold otherwise.