Opinion

Mary Elizabeth Leary and Glenda H. Williams v. Stephen Daeschner

  • 349 F.3d 888
  • 57 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 216
  • 20 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1148
  • 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 23562
  • 2003 WL 22718792
Court
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Filed
Nov 19, 2003
Status
Published
Author
Batchelder
On the bench
Batchelder, Moore, Clay
Cited by
894 cases

holding that courts may deny leave to amend under Rule 15(a)(2) based on “‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.’” (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962))

How later courts described this case

  • holding that courts may deny leave to amend under Rule 15(a)(2) based on “‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.’” (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962))
  • holding that, where a party could have pleaded the claim or defense within the parameters of the court’s scheduling order, because the party was aware of the underlying facts and circumstances giving rise to the claim or defense, lack of diligence and unwarranted delay, not “good cause,” are present
  • holding that the Rule 16(b)(4) “good cause” standard was not met where plaintiffs could have pled their new claim for money damages within the parameters of the court’s scheduling order because plaintiffs were well aware of the underlying facts and the various types of relief available
  • finding that “the district court properly applied the governing law[]” when its “opinion implicitly, if not explicitly, commented on the prejudice that [defendant] would suffer if the [p]laintiffs were permitted to ‘recast’ their claims at this late stage in the proceedings”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. Although I agree with the majority opinion with respect to its holdings regarding the motion for leave to amend and the motion for jury trial, I dissent because I find no evidence in this record that Appellants were transferred because they exercised their First Amendment rights. Neither do I find any basis upon which Superintendent Daeschner could be held liable, even if the Appellants could demonstrate that their transfers were retaliatory. I would therefore AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

I.

The “Evidence” Upon Which the Majority Bases its Holding is Not Evidence

The majority holds that the Appellants have provided evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact regarding the reason for their transfers. The evidence to which the majority points as “most promising” includes Ms. Howard’s testimony that, as the majority quotes it, “Leary was ‘probably [transferred] because of [her speaking out on school-related issues] and some other things,’ J.A. at 296 (Howard Test.),” a statement about which the majority opinion notes, “Howard later retracted this testimony, stating that Leary was transferred because she failed to ‘embrace change.’ J.A. at 297 (Howard Test.)” Both this quotation and the pronouncement that it was retracted mischar-acterize Howard’s testimony. The testimony to which the majority opinion cites reads in full as follows:

Q. Well, was there anything else? I mean, Ms. Leary alleged she was a vocal person. Is she?

A. Yes, she is.

Q. And she has alleged and said that she speaks out.

A. Yes. Yells out. She speaks out.

Q. Yells out, speaks out, whatever. And that she is one of the more ringleaders or prominent people who have positions on issues such as this?

A. Yes.

Q. That’s true?

A. Yes.

Q. And she’s alleging here that it’s because of this that she’s being transferred?

A. It’s probably because of that and some other things.

*912 Q. Well—

A. Which says that she’s unwilling to embrace change.

Q. Well, you said she was unwilling to embrace the collaborative model. Is she also being transferred because she’s just a vocal persona and yells out?

A. No, I wouldn’t think so. We also had a DI program, a Direct Instruction reading program, I mentioned when I first begun the testimony.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. And there was some teachers who participated in that there were some who didn’t and wouldn’t. She was one of those, also.

Q. One of those who?

A. Would not embrace that change.

Q. Okay. Well, you said that she was properly characterizing herself as one of the more prominent ringleaders or agitators for something including discipline or whatever at the school. Was that the reason she was recommended or at least signed off by you as being appropriate for transfer as not a team player?

A. Yes.

Q. Because she wasn’t one of the leaders?

A. No, because she wouldn’t embrace the changes in our school.

J.A. 296-97. Ms. Howard did not state that Leary was transferred because of her speaking out; Howard merely confirmed that this is what Leary alleged. Ms. Howard’s own testimony was that Leary was transferred because “she’s unwilling to embrace change.” J.A. at 297. Ms. Howard simply did not make the statement that the majority points to as “most promising;” to be charitable, the majority opinion cobbles together parts of a statement taken out of context. I find the majority’s “most promising” support altogether wanting.

If other evidence supported the majority opinion, I could perhaps agree with its holding. But it does not. Instead, the majority cites “testimony from fellow teachers expressing opinions that Appellants were transferred because they were too vocal.” [ Majority Opinion at 902], This opinion testimony is not evidence. It is pure conjecture, unsupported by any personal knowledge or foundation.

For example, one of the peer teachers to whom Appellants point, Ms. Toliafero, responded to the question of why the Appellants were transferred, “I think because they were vocal.” J.A. at 447. No foundation whatever was laid for this belief. According to Appellants’ brief, Ms. Shalda, another of Appellants’ colleagues, also surmised that Appellants’ were transferred because they were outspoken. The record, however, reflects that Ms. Schalda’s testimony (J.A. at 431-36) includes no mention of a belief that Appellants were transferred for this reason. Another teacher, Ms. Drescher, testified that Appellants were “among the more vocal people” at the school, (J.A. at 200), and that in her opinion, Appellants were transferred “because they spoke out about the lack of discipline.” J.A. at 202. When the district court asked Ms. Drescher why she believed that, Ms. Drescher’s answer was “[f]or whatever reason would there be.” J.A. at 203. This enigmatic answer did not satisfy the district court, so it pressed further, “[s]o done through a process of elimination?” J.A.at 203. Ms. Drescher answered, “I have taught with them all. If they have 30 years of good teaching evaluations, that should stand for itself.” J.A. at 203. Bald assertions, unsupported by any personal knowledge or facts, but rather reached by process of elimination, are not evidence.

Appellants’ own assertions as to why they were transferred likewise lack any basis in fact. The majority opinion admits that both Leary and Williams were “baf *913 fled” by their transfers. To support its holding that the Appellants have nonetheless presented evidence of retaliatory motivation, the majority opinion declares that: “Leary testified that she had no idea why she was transferred, so her ‘best guess is being too vocal,’ J.A. at 338-39 (Leary Test.)” [Majority Opinion at 20] and Williams “seemed baffled by her transfer and testified that ‘[t]he only conclusion I could come to is that I was too vocal.’ J.A. at 460 (Williams Test).” [Majority Opinion at 902], The Appellants’ guesses are just that; they are not evidence. Therefore, because there is not even a scintilla of evidence upon which the jury could find in Appellants’ favor, I cannot join in the majority’s opinion.

II.

Appellants Established No Connection Between Their Speech and Defendant Daeschner’s Actions

As the majority rightly recognizes, supervisory liability is only appropriate in § 1983 actions when “the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Bellamy, 729 F.2d at 421. In the prior published opinion in this case, a panel of this court suggested that merely “showing that [Daeschner] did not know the Appellants personally” cannot shield him from liability. Leary, 228 F.3d at 740. And it opined that failure to perform his job properly, acquiescing in constitutional violations, or encouraging subordinates to transfer “particularly vocal” teachers could sustain a trier of fact’s conclusion that Daeschner is liable for constitutional violations. See id. In short, if evidence were proffered that Daeschner acquiesced or encouraged Appellants’ transfer due to their outspoken criticisms, then a trier of fact might find him liable for constitutional violations.

No such evidence, however, appears anywhere in the record. Instead, it is clear from the record that the decision to transfer Appellants, and commensurate knowledge of their proclivity for expressive conduct, rested solely on Dr. Merri-weather, Howard, and Bowlds. Moreover, Daeschner specifically testified that he had “never had any contact with any of the Appellants until subsequent to the filing of this action,” (J.A. at 231) and he “was not aware that these individuals had ever complained about anything.” J.A. at 231. The majority opinion twists this evidence into a basis for finding supervisory liability, suggesting that it might support a jury’s finding that Daeschner is liable for failure to do his job or for relying on recommendations of his employees. But neither of these constitutes encouragement or knowing acquiescence.

By holding supervisors potentially liable for all the actions of those they supervise, even where the uncontroverted evidence establishes no personal knowledge of a connection between the adverse employment action and exercise of free speech, and no basis for a finding that the supervisor knew or should have known that the employees on whom he relied were not rehable, the majority extends Monell liability far beyond rational application. Indeed, the majority opinion extends far beyond its logical bounds this court’s own language from our prior opinion in this very case: “Daeschner might be hable if the Appellants can show that he encouraged his subordinates to transfer teachers who were particularly vocal in speaking out against school pohcy through his mandate to transfer those teachers who were not ‘team players.’ ” Leary, 228 F.3d at 740. The record contains no evidence that Daeschner did so, and, in fact, it is hard to imagine a case where a supervisor could be shown to have less connection to the alleged constitutional violation. The lengths *914 to which the majority opinion suggests that supervisors must to go in order to protect themselves from liability would effectively preclude the delegation of authority to subordinates at all, a result far afield from that required by any prior decision of this circuit or the Supreme Court.

Because there is no evidence to support the conclusion that Appellants’ exercise of free speech was a substantial factor in their transfer, and, even if there were, there is no evidence to support a finding that Daeschner encouraged or acquiesced in the alleged constitutional violations, I respectfully dissent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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