stating that "California law presumes at-will employment where contract terms do not specify otherwise," and that "[w]hile California courts will look to factors such as employer personnel policies, longevity of service, and assurances of continued employment in determining whether the employer’s conduct `gave rise to an implied-in-fact contract,’ they have been careful not to interpret such factors too liberally," and holding, in light of employee’s short term of employment and "explicit at-will provisions contained in her employment letter and employee handbook" that "no implied-in-fact contract was created that limited Amway’s ability to terminate employment at any time"
How later courts described this case
- stating that "California law presumes at-will employment where contract terms do not specify otherwise," and that "[w]hile California courts will look to factors such as employer personnel policies, longevity of service, and assurances of continued employment in determining whether the employer’s conduct `gave rise to an implied-in-fact contract,’ they have been careful not to interpret such factors too liberally," and holding, in light of employee’s short term of employment and "explicit at-will provisions contained in her employment letter and employee handbook" that "no implied-in-fact contract was created that limited Amway’s ability to terminate employment at any time"
- holding that “the statutory and regulatory language of FMLA makes clear that where an employee is - subjected to negative consequences simply because he has used FMLA leave, the employer has interfered with the employee’s FMLA leave rights.”
- concluding the plaintiff had raised a triable issue of material fact where, inter alia, employer repeatedly denied leave and “the proximity in time between the leave and her termination” provided “supporting evidence of a connection between the two events”
- concluding in an FMLA interference claim that “the proximity in time between the leave and [plaintiff’s] termination also provides supporting evidence of a connection between the two events”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Crawford v. JP Morgan Chase NA, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (2013)
) Chase correctly notes Xin Liu is distinguishable because in Xin Liu the incorrect designation of leave as “personal” made it subject to employer discretion, where Crawford’s flex-time arrangement gave him complete discretion over his absences, and Crawford agreed to this arrangement.
The opinion
RYMER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I see the FMLA claim differently from the majority opinion, although I concur in the disposition of claims for breach of an implied-in-fact contract and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Liu never argued in the district court that “mischaracterizing” her leave as personal leave rather than FMLA leave constituted “interference” with her rights to FMLA leave. In any event, Amway *1145 granted Liu’s requests for leave, albeit for less time than she wanted. How her leave was labeled could not have made any difference in this case, because she was on authorized leave when she was terminated (November 18, 1998) as a part of a reduction in force. Liu does not dispute the bona fides of the reduction in force. Thus, as the district court saw it (and so do I), Amway could still have terminated Liu even if she had been on leave designated as FMLA leave and regardless of whether she had been on leave through December.
For the same reason, I disagree that reversal is required even if the district court should not have treated Liu’s remaining claims as interrelated discrimination claims based on retaliation — and so subject to the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) — but should instead have considered whether Amway used the taking of (FMLA) leave as a “negative factor” in its decision to terminate Liu under the analysis prescribed by Bachelder v. America West Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir.2001). Liu does not have a substantive right to be compensated or reinstated if she would not otherwise have been employed because her position was eliminated in a reduction in force. But at a minimum, because the parties did not argue the applicability of Bachelder before the district court, nor did they litigate this case on summary judgment using the Bachelder standard, and because they offer no insight on appeal as to how Bachelder plays out on the record adduced, I would remand for the parties and the district court to revisit the issue in light of the standard that we now hold is correct.