Opinion

Kenneth J. Haugen v. Rochelle Brosseau, Puyallup Police Department the City of Puyallup

  • 339 F.3d 857
  • 2003 Daily Journal DAR 8684
  • 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6893
  • 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 15517
  • 2003 WL 21782540
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Aug 4, 2003
Status
Published
Author
Reinhardt
On the bench
Reinhardt, Fletcher, Gould
Cited by
42 cases

Reversed on other grounds by Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004)

holding that a police officer’s pursuit of a fleeing felon in an automobile played a “causal role” in an ensuing wreck, “but not the kind of cause the law recognizes as culpable.... [A] criminal’s effort to shift the blame [to police] ... is not one that any legal system can accept.”

How later courts described this case

  • holding that a police officer’s pursuit of a fleeing felon in an automobile played a “causal role” in an ensuing wreck, “but not the kind of cause the law recognizes as culpable.... [A] criminal’s effort to shift the blame [to police] ... is not one that any legal system can accept.”
  • collecting cases in which prior crimes included participation in a major narcotics ring, assault, violent assault of a police officer, and firing a gun
  • noting that the plaintiff was "a desperate man taking desperate measures”
  • “Where a suspect threatens an officer with a weapon such as a gun or a knife, the officer is justified in using deadly force.... On the other hand, the mere fact that a suspect possesses a weapon does not justify deadly force.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge,

concurring:

I join fully in Judge Fletcher’s opinion for the court, on the understanding that officers may not use deadly force against an otherwise nondangerous felony suspect simply because a chase of that suspect, high-speed or otherwise, would become or does become dangerous. Rather, as I understand the controlling law, if a high-speed chase of a nondangerous felony suspect would be, or becomes, dangerous, the officers must terminate the chase. In other words, the chase itself cannot create the danger that justifies shooting a suspect who, under Garner, may not otherwise be shot. I do not understand the out-of-circuit cases discussed in Judge Fletcher’s excellent opinion and in the dissent to hold otherwise.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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