concluding that a baek-andforth exchange between the prosecutor and defendant concerning her sentence where the defendant stated more than once that she understood the terms demonstrated that the term prompted her to accept the agreement
How later courts described this case
- concluding that a baek-andforth exchange between the prosecutor and defendant concerning her sentence where the defendant stated more than once that she understood the terms demonstrated that the term prompted her to accept the agreement
- holding that a prisoner was entitled to specifically enforce an oral plea agreement for seven and a half years, even though she would not ordinarily be eligible for parole for ten years under the law
- countering an argument that a prosecutor’s promise of parole could not be specifically enforced because "only the Board of Prisons has the authority to reduce a sentence” by noting the constitutional consideration that "the Board’s discretion ... applies] only to those who are legitimately imprisoned,” but if the prosecutor’s promise were not enforceable the imprisonment would not be legitimate
- recognizing federal due process right to enforcement of oral plea agreement but noting that terms of an unambiguous oral agreement may not be contradicted by parol evidence
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Conspicuously missing from the majority’s analysis is any meaningful discussion of the rationale employed by the California Court of Appeal in denying Brown’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We cannot grant federal habeas relief just because we would have come to a different decision. State court decisions are subject to federal “habeas relief only if they are not merely erroneous, but ‘an unreasonable application’ of clearly established federal law, or based on an ‘unreasonable determination of the facts.’” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 , 123 S.Ct. 362, 366 , 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) (emphasis added by the Court).
The California Court of Appeal reviewed the entire record, not just the portion of the change-of-plea transcript quoted by the majority, and found that Brown knew that she had not been guaranteed release after serving half the minimum time with *1163 good behavior, but only that she would be parole-eligible at that time.
Brown plead guilty on January 28, 1986. On February 28, 1986, Brown received a 15 years-to-life sentence and 135 days actual and conduct credits. Brown was committed on March 27, 1986. Not counting her precommittment [sic] credits, if Brown’s claims were true, she would have been entitled to release no later than September 1993. However, Brown’s Minimum Eligible Parole Date (MEPD) was set at January 4,1995. Nothing in the record indicates Broum objected to the January 4, 1995, MEPD. Brown’s Initial Parole Consideration Hearing was held on July 13,1994. Brown, who was represented by counsel, was denied parole. Brown did not claim she was entitled to release.
On January 16, 1997, Brown, represented by the same attorney, again was denied parole. Again, Brown did not argue she was entitled to release. On March 26,1998, Broum, represented by a different attorney, again was denied parole. The Board noted Brown had been discipline-free throughout her commitment, and had completed some education and self-help programs. However, as was true at her earlier hearings, Brown continued to minimize her responsibility for the crime, had not sought psychological counseling, and had not completed a vocation course of study. Again, Brown did not claim she was entitled to release.
Brown’s inaction is consistent with a belief that her parole was conditional, belying her claim that she would be released in seven and one-half years.
In re Broum, No. B128995, slip op. at 7-8, 12 (Cal.Ct.App. May 28, 1999) (emphasis added).
In other words, although represented by two different lawyers, Brown did not see fit to claim entitlement to release pursuant to her plea agreement until nearly three years after she says she should have gotten out. The California Court of Appeal held that, viewing the record in its entirety and in context, Brown knew and understood that seven-and-a-half years was merely her minimum time to parole eligibility. Even if one could find that Brown thought she had been promised release after seven-and-a-half of years of good behavior, it was at least reasonable to find that she knew she hadn’t been. For that reason, federal habeas relief was correctly denied. I respectfully dissent.