holding that enforcement of an appeal waiver in a plea agreement is appropriate where the appeal falls within the scope of the waiver, the defendant entered into both the plea agreement and the appeal waiver knowingly and voluntarily, and enforcement of the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice
How later courts described this case
- holding that enforcement of an appeal waiver in a plea agreement is appropriate where the appeal falls within the scope of the waiver, the defendant entered into both the plea agreement and the appeal waiver knowingly and voluntarily, and enforcement of the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice
- holding that an appeal waiver bars this court’s review of supervised-release conditions under the miscarriage of justice exception when defendants do not claim “that the supervised release conditions eonstitute[] a miscarriage of justice because they were based on some constitutionally impermissible factor”
- explaining that this Court should enforce an appeal waiver and dismiss the appeal where the issues on appeal fall within the scope of the waiver, both the plea agreement and the waiver were entered into knowingly and voluntarily, and no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the waiver
- holding that an appeal waiver in a plea agreement will be enforced when the appeal falls within the scope of the waiver, both the waiver and the plea agreement were entered into knowingly and voluntarily, and enforcement of the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BYE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I applaud Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold’s doctrinal consistency. As a practical matter, however, I doubt criminal defendants have the prescience and bargaining power necessary to participate as full and equal players in the contractual process Judge Arnold envisions. Applying pure contract theory in the plea bargain context insufficiently accounts for the imbalance of power between prosecutors and defendants. Nor does contract theory acceptably govern the disparate consequences to the parties should they misjudge the risks. I am particularly troubled by the risk of an egregious and unbounded sentencing decision that could not be foreseen even by diligent counsel. Prior cases have therefore refused to endorse a purely contractual analysis of plea bargains. Margalli-Olvera v. INS, 43 F.3d 345, 351 (8th Cir.1994); United States v. Britt, 917 F.2d 353, 359 (8th Cir.1990). In sum, I believe plea agreements are sufficiently different from other contracts to demand greater flexibility in their enforcement. For these reasons, I concur in the opinion of the court.