finding that, even where the IJ went “beyond the bounds of propriety to make some additional and problematic generalized assertions ... in the context of the record as a whole there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the overall proceedings were biased in violation [the applicant’s] right to due process”
How later courts described this case
- finding that, even where the IJ went “beyond the bounds of propriety to make some additional and problematic generalized assertions ... in the context of the record as a whole there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the overall proceedings were biased in violation [the applicant’s] right to due process”
- stating that, although “we are understandably troubled by some of [the IJ’s] comments, in the context of the record as a whole there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the overall proceedings were biased in violation of [the petitioner]’s right to due process”
- holding that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review issues not raised before the BIA because 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) provides for judicial review of final orders of removal "only if ... the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies”
- stating that a petitioner “is required to raise and exhaust his or her remedies as to each claim or ground for relief if he or she is to preserve the right of judicial review of that claim”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BECKER, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
The opinion of the Immigration Judge (IJ) is laden with statements such as the following, which I find troubling in terms of their viability as credibility judgments:
(1) “The respondent testified that he was treated with herbs, by his grandmother and mother, and told the Court these are the way things are done in Sudan, people do not go to the hospital as they do here in the Western World. Again, that is not the case, all countries all [sic] have hospitals and doctors, however, he wish *600 [sic] to provide this false information regarding the medical institution about his country, so be it.” [Op. at 596-597] However, based upon available information about the Sudan, the Respondent’s contention seems reasonable. At all events, the basis for the IJ’s conclusion seems far from clear; rather, it seems quite tenuous.
(2) “I notice in his asylum application he conveniently stated that fortunately, all of his beatings left him without scars. If respondent was beaten as much as he was beaten on March 3, 2001, given he left his country in August 2001, it’s highly improbable that all of his sears would have been healed by the time his asylum application was prepared and submitted to the Court. As I am not a medical physician, the Court will not address this matter any further. But clearly, that statement is highly improbable.” [Op. at 598-599.] We, on the other hand, can easily conceive of beatings that do not leave scars; they might even be administered in such a way as not to do so.
(3) “It’s very unlikely that the respondent would have been able to travel from other destinations to the United States under Mr. Hafiz Sulman’s name, without Mr. Sulman’s knowledge. There must have been some arrangements made between the two.” [Op. at 599-600.] In contrast, we do not know why Abdulrah-man could not have traveled without Sul-man’s knowledge. Indeed, how could he have communicated with Sulman under the circumstances?
The Immigration Judge’s statements barely cross the line into the realm of fact finding, although Judge Shadur is correct that, in view of our extremely narrow standard of review, we are constrained to view them as so doing. While I join in Judge Shadur’s opinion, I write separately to highlight these statements and to express my extreme discomfiture with them, as they border on the cavalier. Indeed, in my view, they come extremely close to constituting reversible error. Judges Sci-riea and Shadur join in this concurrence.