stating that, "although [Local] Rule 56[] is designed to streamline the district court’s consideration of summary judgment motions,” not verifying in the record the assertions in the motion for summary judgment "would derogate the truth-finding functions of the judicial process by substituting convenience for facts”
How later courts described this case
- stating that, "although [Local] Rule 56[] is designed to streamline the district court’s consideration of summary judgment motions,” not verifying in the record the assertions in the motion for summary judgment "would derogate the truth-finding functions of the judicial process by substituting convenience for facts”
- holding that not verifying the assertions in the motion for summary judgment "would derogate the truth-finding functions of the judicial process by substituting convenience for facts"
- recognizing that failing to verify uncontested assertions in a movant’s statement of facts “would derogate the truth-finding functions of the judicial process by substituting convenience for facts”
- holding that not verifying in the record the assertions in the motion for summary judgment "would derogate the truth-finding functions of the judicial process by substituting convenience for facts"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KEARSE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s view that the district court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of defendants on the ground that there was probable cause for the arrest of plaintiff Mark Giannullo should be overturned. The facts asserted in the statement pursuant to Local Rule 56.1 (“Rule 56.1 statement”) filed by defendants in support of their motion for summary judgment — and not disputed by Giannullo in his responding Rule 56.1 statement — included the following sequence of events. Outside a methadone clinic, in an area being subjected to surveillance because of suspected drug activity, police officers observed Giannullo emerge from the clinic, speak to one Kevin Oliver, reenter the clinic, reemerge carrying a brown paper bag, and hand the bag to Oliver. Giannullo and Oliver then walked off in different directions. Oliver was then observed reaching into the bag, removing something, and throwing the bag and its remaining contents into a trash can. Oliver was then stopped by police officers and was found to have in his possession, inter alia, a bottle of methadone with someone else’s name on it and a glassine containing a substance that field-tested positive for heroin. Giannullo was then stopped by police officers and placed under arrest.
Giannullo, a counselor in the methadone clinic, was eventually released, and no criminal charges were filed against him. He commenced the present action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of New York and a police officer for arrest without probable cause.
In ruling on defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the district court stated that the issue of whether Giannullo’s arrest was based on probable cause — the existence of which would of course defeat Giannullo’s claim of arrest without probable cause — is for the court to decide as a matter of law “[w]here there is no dispute as to the information the defendants had prior to the arrest.” Memorandum & Order dated March 8, 2002 (“Decision”), at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted) (em *144 phasis added). The court had noted certain respects in which Giannullo’s Rule 56.1 statement disputed defendants’ Rule 56.1 assertions, see, e.g., Decision at 3, and noted Giannullo’s argument that the above “facts [we]re insufficient to” provide probable cause to arrest him, id. at 6 ; but the court pointed out, accurately, that “[plaintiff does not dispute the information available to the officers,” id. Having noted that the officers arrested Giannullo after finding that Oliver, who had been given the bag by Giannullo, was in possession of, inter alia, heroin, see id. at 3 , the court found that probable cause for Giannullo’s arrest existed because “the officers’ belief was reasonable under all the circumstances that existed at the time,” id. at 7 .
The majority of this panel, while not disagreeing that a sequence of events as set out in defendants’ Rule 56.1 statement would be sufficient as a matter of law to show that Giannullo is not entitled to recover on his claim of arrest without probable cause, reverses the grant of summary judgment despite the fact that, in opposing the motion for summary judgment, Gian-nullo did not dispute that sequence. The majority rules that the district court could not properly grant summary judgment because defendants, in setting forth the above sequence in their Rule 56.1 statement, did not cite evidence as to the relative times at which the officers stopped Oliver and arrested Giannullo. It points out that “[i]t is the movant’s burden to show that no genuine factual dispute exists ....” Majority Opinion ante at 140. I take no issue with that statement of principle; however, my view is that the district court may properly conclude that that burden is carried as to a factual assertion set forth in the moving party’s Rule 56.1 statement that is not disputed in the opponent’s responding Rule 56.1 statement. I base this view on subsection (c) of Rule 56.1, which states that
[a]U material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served by the opposing party.
Local Rule 56.1(c) (emphasis added).
Nonetheless, citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158, 160 , 90 S.Ct. 1598 , 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970), the majority states that “summary judgment must be denied,” “where the movant ‘fail[s] to fulfill its initial burden’ of providing admissible evidence of the material facts entitling it to summary judgment.” Majority Opinion ante at 140 (emphases added). In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), however, the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that a defendant is not entitled to summary judgment based on the plaintiffs inability to prove an element of his claim unless the defendant itself provides admissible evidence. In Celotex, the Supreme Court considered a court of appeals decision reversing a grant of summary judgment because the moving defendant had
“made no effort to adduce any evidence, in the form of affidavits or otherwise, to support its motion.” [Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.] 244 U.S.App.D.C. [160], at 163, 756 F.2d [181], at 184 [(D.C.Cir.1985)] (emphasis in original). According to the [court of appeals] majority, Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and this Court’s decision in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159 , 90 S.Ct. 1598 , 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970), establish that “the party opposing the motion for summary judgment bears the burden of responding *145 only after the moving party has met its burden of coming forward with proof of the absence of any genuine issues of material fact.” 244 U.S.App. D. C., at 163, 756 F.2d, at 184 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
477 U.S. at 321-22 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, finding “no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.” 477 U.S. at 323 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 (emphasis omitted). The Court stated:
We think that the position taken by the majority of the Court of Appeals is inconsistent with the standard for summary judgment set forth in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as to any material fact,” since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law” because the nonmov-ing party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.
477 U.S. at 322-23 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 325 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 (“we do not think ... Adickes ... should be construed to mean that the burden is on the party moving for summary judgment to produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact ... with respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof. Instead, ... the burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’ — that is pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” (emphasis added)).
The majority here also relies on subsection (d) of Rule 56.1 for its ruling that a movant cannot be granted summary judgment unless it cites evidence in support of every material factual proposition set forth in its Rule 56.1 statement. That subsection states that
[ejach statement of material fact by a movant or opponent must be followed by citation to evidence which would be admissible, set forth as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e).
Local Rule 56.1(d). However, the purpose of subsection (d) is to “free[ ] district courts from the need to hunt through voluminous records without guidance from the parties,” Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 74 (2d Cir.2001) (“Holtz”), and such a need arises only with respect to a fact that is in dispute, see, e.g., id. at 73 (the “court ‘is not required to consider what the parties fail to point out’ in their Local Rule 56.1 statements”); Monahan v. New York City Department of Corrections, 214 F.3d 275, 292 (2d Cir.2000) (same).
*146 There is language in Holtz suggesting that the assertions in a defendant’s Rule 56.1 statement “cannot be deemed true simply” by reason of being uncontested. 258 F.3d at 73 . I see two problems with reliance on that statement. First, it was not a holding, for as Holtz itself noted, the district court had not simply deemed the defendant’s uncontested Rule 56.1 statement true but had scrutinized the record to determine whether there was a factual dispute, see 258 F.3d at 72-73 . Second, the only appellate court case cited by Holtz in support of that dictum is one whose premise is flawed in light of Celotex. In Zanghi v. Incorporated Village of Old Brookville, 752 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir.1985), interpreting a predecessor to Local Rule 56.1, we had stated that “[a] Rule 9(g) statement by counsel on a motion for summary judgment cannot be a substitute for an affidavit as to the facts.” 752 F.2d at 47 (quoted in Holtz, 258 F.3d at 73 (emphasis mine)). This statement presupposes that a defendant’s summary judgment motion must always be supported by an affidavit as to the facts. In Celotex, however, the Supreme Court found “no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion [negating an element of an opponent’s claim] with affidavits or other similar materials.” 477 U.S. at 323 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 .
I note further that although the majority analogizes the present case to Holtz, see Majority Opinion ante at 140, the two cases are not alike. In Holtz , the plaintiff, a pro se litigant, had filed no Rule 56.1 statement whatever; she had, however, given deposition testimony that squarely contradicted the factual assertion the defendant sought to have deemed admitted. Here, Giannullo, represented by counsel, filed a painstaking Rule 56.1 statement taking issue with some of defendants’ factual assertions but not with others. And neither Giannullo nor the majority has pointed to anything in the record that contradicts the sequence of events set forth in defendants’ Rule 56.1 statement.
The majority’s statement that “ ‘[t]he local rule does not absolve the party seeking summary judgment of the burden of showing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,’ ” Majority Opinion ante at 140 (quoting Holtz, 258 F.3d at 74 ), is true but inapposite here. The requirement that the moving party show its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law means simply that those facts as to which there is no genuine dispute must be legally sufficient. This requirement does not suggest that dispositive facts that are undisputed must nonetheless be proved.
Our precedents state that a district court “has broad - discretion to determine whether to overlook a party’s failure to comply with local court rules.” Holtz, 258 F.3d at 73 (citing cases). But the majority’s decision today eliminates half of that discretion by reading subsection (d) of Rule 56.1 (citations to evidence must be provided) as eclipsing subsection (c) (in the absence of dispute, facts will be deemed admitted). The majority thus creates the anomaly that a district court has discretion to excuse the nonmoving party’s failure to dispute the moving party’s Rule 56.1 assertions, but that the court has no discretion to excuse the moving party’s failure to cite evidence in support of a fact that is not in dispute.
When Local Rule 56.1 is interpreted, as it is by the majority, to mean that, if unaccompanied by citations to evidence, a moving party’s assertions of dispositive facts that are not disputed “must nonetheless be disregarded,” Majority Opinion ante at 140, I view Rule 56.1 as inconsis *147 tent with Rule 56, see, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 Advisory Committee Note (1937) (“Summary judgment procedure is a method for promptly disposing of actions in which there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.”), and hence invalid, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (a) (local rules must be consistent with Federal Rules of Procedure). I believe it more appropriate to read subsections (c) and (d) of Rule 56.1, in conjunction with Rule 56, as meaning (1) that if the moving party’s Rule 56.1 statement cites evidence that supports its assertion as to a dispositive material fact, summary judgment should normally be granted if the opposing party either (a) fails to dispute that assertion or (b) disputes the assertion but fails to support his disputation with materials in accordance with Rule 56(e); and (2) that if the moving party’s Rule 56.1 statement does not cite any evidence to support its assertion of a dispositive material fact, summary judgment (a) should normally be granted if the opposing party fails to dispute that assertion, but (b) should be denied if the opposing party disputes that assertion, even if he does not cite any evidence in support of his position.
In the present case, Giannullo disputed certain of the assertions set out in defendants’ Rule 56.1 statement, including some of the assertions in the very paragraphs that set out the sequence of events. But he did not dispute the sequence, i.e., that before he was arrested the police had found heroin on Oliver, to whom they had seen Giannullo give a bag from which Oliver had taken something that he retained while discarding the bag. Given that sequence, Giannullo could not prove an essential element of his claim, i.e., that his arrest was without probable cause. I thus see no error in the granting of summary judgment.