explaining that USTs are officers of Department of Justice who protect public interest by aiding bankruptcy judges in monitoring certain aspects of bankruptcy proceedings, which, together with § 307, gave them standing to challenge a chapter 11 debtor’s retention of financial advisor
How later courts described this case
- explaining that USTs are officers of Department of Justice who protect public interest by aiding bankruptcy judges in monitoring certain aspects of bankruptcy proceedings, which, together with § 307, gave them standing to challenge a chapter 11 debtor’s retention of financial advisor
- holding that indemnification provision in retention application of professional which excludes gross negligence and willful misconduct is consistent with professional’s fiduciary duty to the estate under the Bankruptcy Code and Delaware law
- holding that the substantial consummation factor weighed against equitable mootness, despite the fact that the plan satisfied the Bankruptcy Code definition, because the relief sought “does not undermine the Plan’s foundation”
- holding that the substantial consummation factor weighed against equitable mootness, despite the plan satisfying the Bankruptcy Code’s definition, because the relief sought “does not undermine the Plan’s foundation”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ALITO, Circuit Judge,
Concurring.
I fully join the thoughtful and scholarly opinion of the court but add a few words in response to Judge Rendell’s concurring opinion. With respect, I believe that Judge Rendell’s opinion quarrels with an opinion other than the one that the court has issued. The opinion of the court, as I understand it, holds only that the “reasonableness” standard of 11 U.S.C. § 328 (a) does not categorically prohibit indemnification of financial advisers, as the United States Trustee argues. If such a blanket prohibition is desirable, it should be enacted by Congress.
Contrary to the suggestion in Judge Rendell’s concurrence, the court does not hold that Houlihan Lokey’s indemnification agreement must be interpreted in accordance with the principles of Delaware corporate law that the opinion of the court discusses. Nor does the court issue an authoritative interpretation of that agreement. Rather, the court discusses principles of Delaware corporate law because they provide a sophisticated framework for evaluating the conduct of financial advisers and because this understanding of the circumstances in which in it sensible to hold financial advisers responsible for unsuccessful business decisions helps to explain why indemnification agreements such as the one in this case are not categorically “unreasonable.”