holding that, even when “the constitutional issue turns on the officers’ [deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm], courts must still consider whether – assuming the facts in the injured party’s favor – it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful”
How later courts described this case
- holding that, even when “the constitutional issue turns on the officers’ [deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm], courts must still consider whether – assuming the facts in the injured party’s favor – it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful”
- recognizing that although Farmer clearly 22 stated that prison officials could not deliberately disregard a substantial risk of serious harm, it 23 left open the issue of when the risk of harm “changes from being a risk of some harm to a 24 substantial risk of serious harm”
- holding that it is not always sufficient, for purposes of the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, “that Farmer clearly states the general rule that prison officials cannot deliberately disregard a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate”
- concluding that Farmer would not have made clear to a “reasonable prison official when the risk of harm from double-celling psychiatric inmates with one another changes from being a risk of some harm to a substantial risk of serious harm”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CANBY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part:
I agree with Judge Rymer’s well-crafted opinion in most respects. Specifically, I agree that Saucier requires a two-step analysis of qualified immunity in this Eighth Amendment case. I also agree that, given Diesso’s classification as appropriate for double-celling, reasonable officers in the position of Arnold and Williams would not have known that double-celling Ford with Diesso would violate Ford’s Eighth Amendment rights.
My disagreement is over the decision by Caden to continue Diesso’s classification as “D” — appropriate for double celling. Judge Rymer’s opinion scrupulously sets forth Diesso’s extraordinary history of violence. It also accurately recites that Ca-den knew of that history, knew that Diesso was given the highest classification of dangerousness, knew of recent incidents and that they had caused Lieutenant Sanchez to note that Diesso should be changed to a single-cell category. Without my repeating all the details so clearly set forth by Judge Rymer, it is sufficient to say that I am convinced that a reasonable officer in Caden’s position would have known that the double-celling classification of Diesso exposed any future cellmate to an excessive risk of serious harm, and that deliberately incurring this risk would violate that cellmate’s Eighth Amendment rights under the principles established by the Supreme Court in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 , 114 S.Ct. 1970 , 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). See Hope v. Pelzer , — U.S. -, -, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 2515 , 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (facts of precedential case need not be “materially similar” to those of case in issue; it is sufficient that pre-existing law makes apparent the unlawfulness of conduct in question).
Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity for Caden and would remand the matter for trial of the claim against him. In all other *1054 respects I concur in Judge Rymer’s opinion.