holding, following remand from the Supreme Court, that verified charge related back to unverified letter where verified charge concerned the same circumstances as the unverified letter and there was no evidence that the unverified letter was substantively deficient
How later courts described this case
- holding, following remand from the Supreme Court, that verified charge related back to unverified letter where verified charge concerned the same circumstances as the unverified letter and there was no evidence that the unverified letter was substantively deficient
- finding in a Title VII case that failure to exhaust the requirement to file a claim with the EEOC within the prescribed time limit was not a jurisdictional requirement
- finding that failure to exhaust upon an allegation of an untimely filed administrative claim is not jurisdictional for a Title VII claim
- holding that a letter sent to the EEOC could constitute a valid Charge
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LUTTIG, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority holds that Professor Edel-man’s November 14 letter was a “charge” for the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994). I continue to believe that the November 14 letter was not a charge, on the grounds that (1) Edelman characterized the letter not as a charge, but, rather, as a request for a charge, (2) Edelman further evidenced his intention that the letter not be regarded as a charge by requesting, in a letter dated November 26, that the EEOC not notify the employer until more than 10 days after November 14 (a request inconsistent with the requirements of the statute), (3) consistent with Edelman’s own actions, the EEOC did not consider or treat the letter as a charge, and (4) the second sworn letter, allegedly amending the first letter, alleges different discriminatory conduct than that claimed in the first letter. Although each of these facts standing alone might be insufficient to conclude that the November 14 letter was not a charge, cumulatively they confirm that neither Edelman nor the EEOC considered this letter a charge.
. The majority’s reliance on Waiters v. Robert Bosch Corp., 683 F.2d 89 (4th Cir.1982), is misplaced. The complainant in Waiters had filed a document fully satisfying the EEOC’s requirements for a charge, and gave no indication that the document was not intended to be a charge. Id. at 92 . Here, Edelman himself requested that the employer not be notified. Given that “[wjhenever a charge is filed ... the Commission shall serve notice of the charge ... on such employer ... within ten days,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (emphasis added), Edelman’s request is a refutation of the suggestion that he intended the letter to be a charge. Edelman’s attorney did state that it was his “understanding that delay occasioned by the interview will not compromise the filing date, which will remain as November 14, 1997.” Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 66 F.Supp.2d 777, 779 (W.D.Va.1999). Although this suggests that Edelman and his attorney perhaps did not understand the EEOC’s regulation concerning relation-back, they could not have misunderstood the painfully clear words of the statute itself.
As I would hold that the November 14 letter was not a charge, I conclude that the April 15, 1998 form submitted by Edelman could not relate back to any valid charge, and hence Edelman’s charge was filed beyond the 300 day deadline allowed by the statute. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.