finding abstention appropriate in part because the case “was gladly litigated by both parties in California,” and that only after Vulcan had received a negative outcome did it seek to “bypass the procedure that [it] had elected to follow” by filing suit in federal court
How later courts described this case
- finding abstention appropriate in part because the case “was gladly litigated by both parties in California,” and that only after Vulcan had received a negative outcome did it seek to “bypass the procedure that [it] had elected to follow” by filing suit in federal court
- finding that the state court’s entry of a final judgment and the state court’s denial of Vulcan’s motion to vacate by the time the district court heard oral arguments on the motion to vacate weighed toward abstention
- holding that because the federal court was required to “consider[] the same evidence and arguments ” as did the state court in an earlier action, dismissal or stay under Colorado River was proper (emphasis added)
- holding that, since the federal court was required to consider the “same evidence and arguments” as the state court did in an earlier action, dismissal or stay under Colorado River was proper
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HERLONG, District Judge,
concurring in the result:
I concur in the result to reverse the district court but on a different basis. Barker asserts that the Rooker-Feldman, infra, doctrine divested the district court of jurisdiction. I agree. While I also agree with the majority’s reasons for reversal, I believe that the question of jurisdiction must first be resolved. See Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 202 (4th Cir.2000) (stating that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional). Because it appears that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divested the district court of jurisdiction, I would reverse on that ground.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that “a United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings.” District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 , 103 S.Ct. 1303 , 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); see also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 , 44 S.Ct. 149 , 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). In making this determination, one pivotal question is whether “the federal plaintiff seeks to set aside a state court judgment or whether he is, in fact, presenting an independent claim.” Brown & Root, 211 F.3d at 202 (internal quotations omitted).
The facts in this case and Brown & Root are essentially the same. Like in Brown & Root, the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., was raised before the California state court and the state court decision preceded the federal court decision. See J.A. 931, 964, & 1111. Therefore, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine appears to divest the district court of jurisdiction. As such, I would reverse on the alternate ground that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.