finding that officers who did not sufficiently identify themselves to a fleeing suspect, and who unreasonably assumed that the suspect was attempting to evade arrest, were not entitled to qualified immunity
How later courts described this case
- finding that officers who did not sufficiently identify themselves to a fleeing suspect, and who unreasonably assumed that the suspect was attempting to evade arrest, were not entitled to qualified immunity
- deciding that presence in a high crime area accompanied by improperly provoked flight is not sufficient to support probable cause for arrest, but expressing, in dicta, uncertainty about existence of reasonable suspicion for a stop: Compare “it’s doubtful that the officers had even reasonable suspicion to stop Marshall” with “if a search of Marshall had turned up a gun or drugs, he would not only not have a viable § 1983 civil claim, he would have had a date to appear in juvenile court on a delinquency charge.”
- concluding there was improper provocation of flight where the defendant “did what any sane person would do if he saw masked men with guns running toward him” and ran
- noting that officers cannot assume that a suspect is fleeing from police when a reasonable officer should have known.that the suspect did not realize his pursuers were police officers
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MANION, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Given the appearance and demeanor of the three defendants as they attempted a surprise execution of a search warrant on a suspected drug house, Marshall had good reason to flee. He may not have heard or at least not believed those chasing him were police. However, when determining whether or not a prudent officer in their position would have believed that probable cause existed to support an arrest, we look to the officers’ knowledge at the time of the arrest, not the suspect’s. See United States v. Gilbert, 45 F.Sd 1163, 1166 (7th Cir.1995). The three officers could have reasonably believed that Marshall’s flight meant he was a “lookout” and wanted to separate himself from the crime scene. They could not have known that he did not hear their shouts of “Stop! Police!” nor failed to recognize them as police officers during the pursuit. Therefore, when they caught up with Marshall, a brief detention and search would not have been out of line. By the time everyone caught their breath it should have been obvious Marshall was not acting as a lookout. The uniformed officers were concerned that Teske was possibly a robber with a gun and Marshall ran to them for protection from the apparent robbers. That determination should have ended the episode because, regardless of the identification issue, the undercover officers should have realized that a person who runs to the aid of uniformed police officers could not be knowingly obstructing a police officer. Instead the officers pressed on with a long detention and a bogus charge of obstruction. As I see it, what occurred after the opportunity to get an explanation from the uniformed officers is where the facts justify the jury’s finding of liability, damages and even punitive damages, excessive as they might have been.