concluding that Teague applies to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petitions and that the new rule of criminal procedure announced in Apprendi does not apply retroactively on initial collateral review
How later courts described this case
- concluding that Teague applies to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petitions and that the new rule of criminal procedure announced in Apprendi does not apply retroactively on initial collateral review
- concluding that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) does not apply retroactively on collateral review
- concluding that Apprendi announced a new rule of criminal procedure and therefore does not apply retroactively on initial collateral review
- concluding that “the new rule of criminal procedure announced in Apprendi does not apply retroactively on initial collateral review”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Woodroffe v. Lampert, 172 F. App'x 759 (2006)
We also reject Woodroffe’s argument that, because Sanchez-Cervantes addressed only whether jury factfinding is more accurate than judicial factfinding, and did not consider the enhanced accuracy of a “beyond a reasonable doubt,” as opposed to a “clear and convincing evidence,” standard, it is inapplicable to his case.
The opinion
HUG, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the opinion because I believe it is compelled by our en banc decision in United States v. Buckland, 277 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc). However, were it not for the majority opinion in Buckland , I would see the case differently. Sanehez-Cervantes was indicted only for violating 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1) with no quantity of drugs specified. Thus, the sentence under § 841(b)(1)(C) was applicable. The quantity of drugs found by the judge exceeded the amount the jury could have found under the indictment and instructions to the jury for a violation of § 841(a)(1). In order for the jury to find these quantities the indictment would have to charge violations of § 841(b)(1)(A) or (B) with an appropriate instruction to the jury. As I contended in my concurring and dissenting opinion in Buckland , 1 this would constitute charging and proving to the jury elements of separate crimes. In that circumstance, the Teague analysis would be quite different.
. See United States v. Buckland, No. 99-30285, 2002 WL 63718 , at *11 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 2002) (en banc) (Hug, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).