finding that because the movant consented to the use of a magistrate judge in his case, he waived “any personal right he may have had to have his case reviewed by an Article III judge”
How later courts described this case
- finding that because the movant consented to the use of a magistrate judge in his case, he waived “any personal right he may have had to have his case reviewed by an Article III judge”
- holding that a consensual delegation of the final judgment in a federal prison *568 er's motion to vacate conviction or sentence to a magistrate judge violated the Constitution
- holding that a consensual delegation of the final judgment in a federal prisoner’s motion to vacate conviction or sentence to a magistrate judge violated the Constitution
- holding that it is unconstitutional for a U.S. magistrate judge to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) over a § 2255 motion
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
I share the majority’s concern over the constitutionality of allowing magistrate judges to dispose of section 2255 motions. I would not, however, reach this constitutional question. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 2498 , *373 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001); United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1435 (5th Cir.1987) (“[W]e insist upon clear congressional expression when the reach of [a] claimed reading provokes issues regarding constitutionally mandated spheres of governmental power.”).
It is axiomatic that only an Article III judge can be vested with the power to conduct a dispositive review of the judgment of another Article III court. 1 Review by the Court of Appeals of a magistrate judge’s final ruling upon a section 2255 petition offers little protection for the structural component of Article III, allowing the parties to agree that an Article III judgement will be subject to review by a non-Article III judge. The force of these concerns should not loosen our restraint. Rather, because we can do so in a principled manner, we ought to read the challenged congressional act to avoid this constitutional ruling.
I would read 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c) to preclude granting magistrate judges the authority to render final judgment in an attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 upon a final judgment of conviction, regardless of the parties’ consent.
The impetus to push the trial of civil cases in federal courts upon magistrate judges is puzzling. According to data compiled by the Administrative Office, each active Article III judge presided over an average of only nine civil trials last year; 2 the median length of a civil trial was one or two days. 3 The criminal docket offers little explanation, for Article III judges presided over an average of only six criminal trials, jury and bench. 4 Despite mounting “case” filings, the number of civil and criminal trials has declined markedly over the past thirty years in all categories of cases. 5 The shrinking number of trials is the subject of a larger debate over the changing role of the United States district courts. 6
This is not to suggest that the Article III trial judges are not working. Rather, this phenomenon calls into question the rationale for the type of work we urge upon magistrate judges. More to the point, the empirical data highlights the wisdom of the structural component of Article III, limiting as it does, or should, the authority of consent by the parties. It is one thing for two parties to agree to resolve their civil dispute outside the courthouse. It is another to accept their agree *374 ment to proceed privately while remaining inside the courthouse. And we have never accepted a purely private resolution of criminal matters. A proceeding to decide if a criminal conviction will stand is a criminal proceeding in every relevant practical and functional sense, however we choose to label it.
I join the holding that petitions for relief from federal criminal convictions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 may not be referred to a magistrate judge for final disposition.
. See Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman, S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 , 68 S.Ct. 431 , 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948) ("Judgments within the powers vested in courts by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution may not lawfully be revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by another Department of Government.”).
. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, "U.S. District Court — Judicial Caseload Profile,” in Federal Court Management Statistics 2000 (2001), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2000.pl; Leonidas Ralph Mecham, 2000 Annual Report of the Director: Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2000 app. this. C-4, D-4 (2001).
. See Mecham, supra note 2, at app. tbl. C-8. This estimate derives from Administrative Office data based on a generous definition of "trial,” which includes "miscellaneous cases, hearings on temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, hearings on contested motions and other contested proceedings in which evidence is introduced.” Id.
. See Administrative Office, supra note 2; Mecham, supra note 2, at app. tbl. D-4.
. This assessment is based on data contained in current and past editions of the Annual Report of the Director: Judicial Business of the United States Courts.
. See e.g., Judith Resnik, Trial As Error, Jurisdiction As Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 924 (2000).