holding that although Social Security Rulings that are issued by the Commissioner of Social Security to clarify implementing regulations and agency policies do not have the force of law, reviewing courts will give them some deference because they represent the Commissioner’s interpretations of the agency’s regulations, unless they are inconsistent with statutes or regulations.
How later courts described this case
- holding that although Social Security Rulings that are issued by the Commissioner of Social Security to clarify implementing regulations and agency policies do not have the force of law, reviewing courts will give them some deference because they represent the Commissioner’s interpretations of the agency’s regulations, unless they are inconsistent with statutes or regulations.
- stating that a “[provider’s] statements must be read 22 in context of the overall diagnostic picture he draws. That a person who suffers from severe 23 panic attacks, anxiety, and depression makes some improvement does not mean that the 24 person’s impairments no longer seriously affect her ability to function in a workplace”
- Recognizing that “[ujnder certain circumstances, a treating physician’s opinion on some matter may be entitled to little if any weight. This might be the case, for instance, if the treating physician ... offers an opinion on a matter not related to her or his area of specialization.” Citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5)
- finding that 17 18 “the ALJ’s specific reason for rejecting [a physician’s] medical opinion [was] not supported by 19 substantial evidence” because, in part, “the ALJ selectively relied on some entries in [the 20 plaintiff’s] records . . . and ignored the many others that indicated continued, severe impairment”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge,
Concurring and Dissenting:
While intertwined with and buried in an intricate discussion of the rules, regulations, and rulings, this case is still another example of this court’s insistence that it be the ultimate trier of fact in social security disability cases. Thus, although the ALJ, who is the true trier of fact, the Appeals Council and the district court judge were all satisfied that Holohan is not disabled, except, perhaps, for alcoholism, 1 we decide that none of them understood the law or the evidence, and, therefore, not only reverse but also direct the payment of benefits. While I agree that the ALJ did not properly touch all of the bases in deciding this case, I do not agree that we should reweigh all of the evidence and grant benefits.
As is common with triers of fact, the majority opinion marshals every bit of evidence that would support its decision that Holohan should get benefits, and denigrates the opinions of the doctors who do not agree with that. For example, Dr. Hsieh’s opinion is accepted, though she wrote very little and had never seen Holo-han, while other physicians are dismissed with the comment that they are wrong, or conclusory, or checked the boxes. None of that is unusual. We regularly engage in complex locutions as we rummage through records and reweigh each piece of evidence, with no real deference whatsoever to those who work with and decide social security disability cases on a day-to-day basis. That approach enables us to cast a brume over the fact that we are actually retrying cases. However, it is one thing to find error; it is quite another to decide that the trier of fact, the expert agency, and the district court have perceptions of the record so inferior to ours that benefits must be ordered with no further ado.
Holohan does seem to be a needy person, and I doubt that she could perform jobs in the national economy. Were my impressions the test, were I an ALJ, I would so find. They are not, and I am not. Thus, while there were errors at the administrative level, I cannot agree that we should take it upon ourselves to order an award of benefits. At most, I would return this case for further proceedings.
Therefore, while I agree that some errors were committed, I dissent from the direction that benefits be awarded at this time.
. Originally, the ALJ had held that alcoholism was a contributing factor material to any disability, but in the proceeding at hand the ALJ determined that alcoholism did not affect her. On the other hand, the ALJ found that she was not disabled at all.