stating that “when the government takes a person into custody against his or her will, it assumes responsibility for satisfying basic human needs such as food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety” (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Co. Dep’t of Social Svcs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989))
How later courts described this case
- stating that “when the government takes a person into custody against his or her will, it assumes responsibility for satisfying basic human needs such as food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety” (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Co. Dep’t of Social Svcs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989))
- holding that county prisoner had adequate post-deprivation remedy through grievance system that allowed prisoners to complain about “any” matter that is “unjust” and provided for direct appeal to the warden
- holding that a fee of approximately $4,000.00 imposed on an inmate for housing costs incurred at a Pennsylvania state prison did not deny the inmate due process or deprive him of equal protection
- holding that the prison’s grievance program, which allowed prisoners to complain about any matter and provided for direct appeal to warden, was an adequate postdeprivation remedy
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RENDELL, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
In his pro se complaint, Tillman, a state prisoner, alleges that the Lebanon County prison took half of the money in his wallet, as well as half of the money orders sent to him, to pay the balance of a daily $10 charge incurred during an earlier prison sentence. The prison took this money pursuant to a policy adopted by the Lebanon County Prison Board. Tillman states, “I sign [sic] no agreement or contracts to have them take my money.” His counseled brief on appeal similarly attacks the prison’s basis for taking his money, stating that “no court, nor any statute, authorizes the imposition of the arbitrary costs forced on appellant against his will.” Brief for Appellant at 6. According to the affidavit of the former Chairman of the Lebanon County Prison Board, the Prison Board adopted the Cost Recovery Program “as a rehabilitative measure, designed to teach sentenced inmates financial responsibility, by requiring them to contribute to the expenses necessary to house, feed, clothe and protect them while incarcerated.” App. 92.
The majority concludes that the prison’s internal grievance procedure provides prisoners with the post-deprivation opportunity for a hearing that due process requires. I agree with the majority’s holding, as far as it goes. However, I do not think we have addressed the more fundamental substantive due process question raised by Tillman’s allegations, namely, what enables the Lebanon County Prison Board to impose this consequence upon a person convicted of a state crime? Can it, on its own, decide to deprive state prisoners unfortunate enough to be housed there of $10 per day, to be paid to the county’s coffers, under the guise of rehabilitating them and teaching them financial responsibility? Although the imposition of this compensation scheme is obviously not the same as restitution, it strikes me as a similar type of sentencing consequence that should emanate from the state in the first instance. 1
As the majority notes, other states have passed legislation authorizing prisons to take inmates’ funds in situations such as this. Interestingly, the Pennsylvania legislature has chosen to authorize county prisons to collect a reasonable amount from prisoners, but the statute applies only to those incarcerated “on weekends or other short periods each week.” 2 I submit *425 that the record and briefs do not explore this issue adequately. I suggest, further, that the majority’s reasoning, contained in a footnote, that a state law establishing boards of inspectors to oversee prison operations provides the requisite authority to impose this charge- as a consequence of incarceration is less than persuasive. I also do not believe that the case law cited by the majority provides a satisfactory paradigm for this type of mandatory charge. 3
Tillman has presented a fundamental question, and I would reverse and remand for further development of this issue.
. In Pennsylvania, "an order of restitution must be based on statutory authority." In the Interest of M.W., 555 Pa. 505 , 725 A.2d 729, 731 (1999) (citing Commonwealth v. Harner, 533 Pa. 14 , 617 A.2d 702, 704 (1992) ("It is generally agreed that restitution is a creature of statute and, without express legislative direction, a court is powerless to direct a defendant to make restitution as part of a sentence.”)). In the federal context, we recently reiterated the "firmly established principle that federal courts may not order restitution in the absence of statutory authorization.” United States v. Akande, 200 F.3d 136, 138 (3d Cir.1999). If the rehabilitative measure Tillman challenges is not a punitive one, what is its precise character?
. Section 2146, "Collection from weekend prisoners,” provides as follows:
The county prison board, or where applicable the county commissioners, may, by res *425 olution which shall establish rates and qualifications, authorize the warden, sheriff or other person in charge of the jail to collect a reasonable amount from prisoners incarcerated only on weekends or other short periods each week.
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit 61 § 2146 (West 1999). See Commonwealth v. Cassell, 12 Pa. D. & C. 4th 265 (York County 1991) (concluding that section 2146 authorized short-term fee to be imposed upon defendant, who had requested deferment of mandatory minimum 48-hour prison sentence).
. The precise question at issue in this appeal was raised in neither Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166 (3d Cir.1997), nor Mastrian v. Schoen, 725 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir.1984) (affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of state correction officials on a complaint alleging an equal protection violation stemming from a now-discontinued experimental program to charge room and board based on inmates' levels of income in a state prison). In Reynolds , we characterized the fee at issue as to be paid in consideration for beneficial medical services, Reynolds, 128 F.3d at 180 , and it is clear from the exceptions to the fee requirement (e.g., initial intake, emergency, psychiatric services, chronic illness screening) that choice was involved to avail oneself of medical services for which a fee was charged, which is not the case here.