explaining that "[t]he reasonableness of a counsel’s performance is an objective inquiry,” which asks "whether some reasonable lawyer could have conducted the trial in that manner" and requires a petitioner to show that "no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that "[t]he reasonableness of a counsel’s performance is an objective inquiry,” which asks "whether some reasonable lawyer could have conducted the trial in that manner" and requires a petitioner to show that "no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take”
- holding that we must evaluate the reasonableness of counsel’s performance based on USCA11 Case: 21-12552 Date Filed: 09/09/2022 Page: 15 of 15 21-12552 Opinion of the Court 15 their perspective at the time and avoid the “distorting effects of hindsight”
- recognizing that because “[sjtacking defenses can hurt a case,” there is “[n]o absolute duty ... to introduce mitigating or character evidence”
- recognizing that counsel’s reliance on a particular defense is “a matter of strategy and is not ineffective unless the petitioner can prove the chosen course, in itself, was unreasonable.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ANDERSON, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
I agree with Judge Barkett that Chandler has satisfied the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). I agree with Judge Tjoflat that the performance prong should be remanded to the district court. Because the district court found that the prejudice prong was not satisfied, it did not address the performance prong. As Judge Tjoflat correctly explains, the district judge who heard the evidence should make the fact findings and resolve the material facts which are in dispute. I agree with Judge Tjoflat that, in this case, an appropriate resolution of the performance prong cannot be made without such fact findings by the district court. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.