concluding that because particular inquiry necessary for defendant to establish innocent-landowner defense to CERCLA liability “is clearly dependent on the totality of the circumstances” and is thus “a very fact-specific question,” summary judgment was inappropriate to establish that, as matter of law, defendant’s actions did not amount to “appropriate inquiry”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that because particular inquiry necessary for defendant to establish innocent-landowner defense to CERCLA liability “is clearly dependent on the totality of the circumstances” and is thus “a very fact-specific question,” summary judgment was inappropriate to establish that, as matter of law, defendant’s actions did not amount to “appropriate inquiry”
- concluding that absent “any evidence that there was human activity involved in whatever movement of hazardous substances occurred on the property,” there is no “disposal”
- holding that proof as to whether a third party was the sole cause of a release is a dispositive issue for purposes of the innocent landowner defense
- holding that proof regarding whether a third party was the sole cause of the release is dispositive concerning the innocent landowner defense
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
While I agree with the majority that the district court’s construction of “disposal” for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (35)(A) is overly expansive, the majority’s interpretation is too narrow. The majority limits “disposal” to “spills occurring by human intervention.” Ante at 705. This language seemingly restricts “disposal” to occasions where property owners release toxic substances themselves, or actively participate in exacerbating existing spills. The result is to potentially provide unjustified cover for spectator polluters, who are aware of past and ongoing toxic releases, yet do nothing to remedy them. Accordingly, I construe “disposal” under § 9601(35)(A) to encompass spills produced by human agency, including those precipitated by willful neglect. This construction conveys the “active” component of “disposal,” yet still provides room for actions that are not affirmatively interventionist, but sufficiently assertive to fall outside the bounds of the CERCLA defense regime. I concur in the court’s judgment and in all other aspects of Judge Boggs’ opinion.