concluding “breathing problems, chest pains, dizziness, sinus problems, headaches and a loss of energy” from exposure to second-hand smoke were “objectively speaking, relatively minor” and were “not the sort of objectively serious injury or medical need that amounts to a denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” (cleaned up)
How later courts described this case
- concluding “breathing problems, chest pains, dizziness, sinus problems, headaches and a loss of energy” from exposure to second-hand smoke were “objectively speaking, relatively minor” and were “not the sort of objectively serious injury or medical need that amounts to a denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” (cleaned up)
- concluding at summary judgment that plaintiff’s complaints of “breathing problems, chest pains, dizziness, sinus problems, headaches and a loss of energy” due to repeated exposure to second-hand cigarette smoke did not constitute a serious medical condition
- holding that a plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because his present injuries—breathing problems, chest pains, dizziness, sinus problems, headaches and a loss of energy— were not objectively serious
- holding that an inmate failed to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment since his complaints of breathing problems, chest pains, dizziness, sinus problems, headaches, and fatigue were “objectively speaking, relatively minor”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FAIRCHILD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part.
The court’s holding in Part 1A is premised on the proposition that although Henderson was a pretrial detainee claiming that he was subjected to punishment without due process, his claim must contain the same elements as if he were a convicted prisoner claiming cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He “must establish the same objective and subjective components required under an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment,” supra, page 844, n. 2.
This decides, without discussion, a question which this court has said is “unsettled.” Mathis v. Fairman, 120 F.3d 88 , 91, n. 3 (7th Cir.1997).
As pointed out in Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254 , 259, n. 1 (7th Cir. *854 1996) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 , 535 & n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 1861 , 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)), “[a] pretrial detainee’s constitutional rights are distinct from a prisoner’s rights because the State cannot punish a pretrial detainee.” One critical element of a detainee’s claim is “punishment.” The corresponding element of an Eighth Amendment claim is “cruel and unusual punishment.” We have said that the pretrial detainee’s rights are “at least as great” as the Eighth Amendment protections. Id. See also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 , 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1718 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998). But we have not previously held that those rights are not greater, and that in order to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment a detainee must claim that the defendants impose deprivation or pain serious enough to constitute cruel or unusual punishment.
Logically, the pretrial detainee need only show that defendants knowingly imposed deprivation or pain amounting to “punishment” and need not establish that the “punishment” was cruel and unusual.
It is true that decisions of this court requiring that a detainee must prove that defendants were deliberately indifferent to harm imposed on plaintiff have referred to the harm as “serious.” The source of this phrasing was Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 , 114 S.Ct. 1970 , 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), where the Supreme Court in an Eighth Amendment context required showing that defendant must have been aware of a “substantial risk of serious harm.”
These Seventh Circuit cases are Estate of Cole, supra, Mathis, supra, Payne for Hicks v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030 (7th Cir.1998) and Higgins v. Correctional Medical Services of Ill., 178 F.3d 508 , 511 (7th Cir.1999). In the first three of these the claim was that officers had failed to prevent the detainees’ suicide, and in Higgins that they failed to treat a dislocated shoulder. In none was the seriousness of the harm an issue. In all the court decided that plaintiff had failed to prove the subjective deliberate indifference element. The first three cases point out the distinct nature of the Fourteenth Amendment claim and state that the rights of the detainee were “at least as great” as those of the prisoner under the Eighth Amendment. See also County of Sacramento, supra. The use of the word “serious” in these circumstances cannot amount to an implied holding that a detainee must claim harm as serious in degree as required for the objective element of an Eighth Amendment claim.
Henderson’s pro se complaint asserted that, notwithstanding his complaints and grievances, defendants continued to subject him to excessive levels of second-hand smoke causing him pain. Accepting these claims as a court must on a motion to dismiss, they are sufficient for a Fourteenth Amendment claim by a detainee.