stating that “[a] full trial de novo in any ERISA dispute where 13 there was a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the individual qualified for a benefit would 14 undermine” the policies underlying ERISA; “[t]he means that suggests itself for accomplishing 15 trial of disputed facts, while preserving the value of the fiduciary review procedure, keeping costs 16 and premiums down, and minimizing diversion of benefit money to litigation expense, is trial on 17 the administrative record, in cases where the trial court does not find it necessary under Mongeluzo 18 to consider additional evidence”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “[a] full trial de novo in any ERISA dispute where 13 there was a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the individual qualified for a benefit would 14 undermine” the policies underlying ERISA; “[t]he means that suggests itself for accomplishing 15 trial of disputed facts, while preserving the value of the fiduciary review procedure, keeping costs 16 and premiums down, and minimizing diversion of benefit money to litigation expense, is trial on 17 the administrative record, in cases where the trial court does not find it necessary under Mongeluzo 18 to consider additional evidence”
- explaining that in a trial on the administrative record, “[the] district judge will be 20 asking . . . as he reads the evidence, . . . whether [the plaintiff] is disabled within the terms of the 21 policy” and may “evaluate the persuasiveness of conflicting testimony and decide which is more 22 likely true”
- explaining that in a trial on the administrative record, “[the] district judge will be asking . . 19 . as he reads the evidence, . . . whether [the plaintiff] is disabled within the terms of the policy” 20 and may “evaluate the persuasiveness of conflicting testimony and decide which is more likely 21 true”
- explaining that in a trial on the administrative record, “[the] district judge will be asking . . 4 . as he reads the evidence, . . . whether [the plaintiff] is disabled within the terms of the policy” 5 and may “evaluate the persuasiveness of conflicting testimony and decide which is more likely 6 true”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part from Judge Kleinfeld’s opinion, and joining Judge Fernandez’s dissent:
I join in Judge Fernandez’s dissent. I write separately only to indicate that, but for my conclusion that the policy conferred discretion upon the plan administrator, I would resolve the remaining issues as did Judge Kleinfeld in parts II, III, and IV of his opinion. I therefore concur in parts II, III, and IV of Judge Kleinfeld’s opinion to that extent.