stating, in a case involving white police officers who beat a black suspect, that the jury's viewing of the movie Malcolm X, its learning that the city was preparing for a potential riot in the event of an acquittal, and its knowledge that the defendants had been members of a controversial undercover police unit was extraneous evidence
How later courts described this case
- stating, in a case involving white police officers who beat a black suspect, that the jury's viewing of the movie Malcolm X, its learning that the city was preparing for a potential riot in the event of an acquittal, and its knowledge that the defendants had been members of a controversial undercover police unit was extraneous evidence
- holding that when the issue before the federal habeas court is the state court’s finding of harmless error, the test set forth in Brecht “precisely captures Congress’s intent as expressed in AEDPA and, therefore, continues to be applicable”
- concluding that “pretrial publicity that would inherently prejudice the jury pool can be discerned only by reviewing both the extent and nature of the publicity and the responses of the prospective jurors in voir dire”
- holding Brecht alone supplied appropriate standard, as Brecht standard "precisely captures” congressional intent as expressed in AEDPA, and because by satisfying Brecht a petitioner simultaneously satisfies the unreasonable application of Chapman standard
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Donald Harris v. Clarice Stovall, 212 F.3d 940 (2000)
169 F.3d 352, 373 (6th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940
The opinion
BRIGHT, Circuit Judge,
concurring separately.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s approach to the “unreasonableness” standard. The majority combines the not entirely consistent standards enunciated by the First and Fifth Circuits. See O’Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir.1998); Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996). The amalgamation of the two standards creates too rigid a bar to proper relief. Either standard alone gives deference to a state court’s application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent as required by the language in the AEDPA. I prefer the Fifth Circuit’s standard articulated in Drinkard, 97 F.3d at 769 , which this circuit previously adopted in Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1135 (6th Cir.1998). In adopting the standard, we stated as follows:
Under the AEDPA, the district court could find the state court determinations unreasonable “only when it can be said that reasonable jurists considering the question would be of one view that the state court ruling was incorrect. In other words, we can grant habeas relief only if a state court decision is so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.”
Herbert, 160 F.3d at 1135 (quoting Drinkard, 97 F.3d at 769 ).
The adoption of “the rule that the unreasonableness of a state court’s application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent will not be ‘debatable among reasonable jurists,’ Drinkard, 97 F.3d at 769 , if it is ‘so offensive to existing precedent, so devoid of record support, or so arbitrary, as to indicate it is outside the universe of plausible, credible outcomes,’ O’Brien, 145 F.3d at 25 [,]” Maj. Op. at 362, approaches a suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus. We must be mindful of the constitutional restriction of Article I, Section 9, which, among other things, states “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” The privilege of the great Writ of Habeas Corpus is an ancient and important one. The congressional admonitions must be read in light of the writ’s extensive history. In terms of this case and other cases in which the great Writ is granted, the main purpose of the Writ is to release a person immediately from an unconstitutional constraint on that person’s liberty. The “reasonable jurist” approach properly balances the statutory language of the AED-PA with the constitutional restriction against suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
The standard in Herbert clearly accords with the language of the AEDPA. To articulate in this case a standard for unreasonableness other than that adopted in Herbert seems unwise and unnecessary.