stating that the presumption of correctness applies to factual determinations made by state trial courts and appellate courts
How later courts described this case
- stating that the presumption of correctness applies to factual determinations made by state trial courts and appellate courts
- applying harmless error analysis on habeas review to bench trial
- applying harmless error analysis on habeas review of bench trial
- the 14 omission from jury instructions of an intent element essential under state law may present a “trial error” to which harmless error analysis may be applied
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the court, because the trial judge who tried the criminal matter that underlies this case entirely failed to make the necessary finding *1137 that Mr. Beets intended to commit a sex act against Ms. Frazier’s will
It is true that the trial court found that Mr. Beets had grabbed and fondled Ms. Frazier against her will, but grabbing and fondling is not a “sex act” under Iowa Code Ann. § 702.17 . See also Iowa Code Ann. § 709.1 . In fact, the sex act that the trial court found that Mr. Beets intended to commit was penis-to-vagina or penis-to-hand contact. Since there is no finding that Mr. Beets intended to effect either of these acts against Ms. Frazier’s will, the record is fatally defective and cannot support a conviction for violating Iowa Code Ann. § 709.11 . The record, no doubt, would have supported such a finding: But that finding was not expressly made, nor can such a finding reasonably be inferred from the finding that was made.
I cannot subscribe to the court’s assertion that any sex act that Mr. Beets intended to commit- “clearly must also have been against Frazier’s will.” Mr. Beets may have hoped that Ms. Frazier would consent to sex acts. Indeed, it seems to be conceded that he relented when she resisted and committed no sex act, as the statute defines that term, against her.
I would therefore reverse the judgment of the district court.