finding plaintiffs' request to "certify!] the first [Team sters,] stage of [their Title VII] pattern or practice claim under (b)(3) is foreclosed by Castaño," considering that the claim as a whole “implicates predominantly individual-specific issues” and “the plaintiffs have not agreed drop their claims for compensatory and punitive damages as a class action issue ”
How later courts described this case
- finding plaintiffs' request to "certify!] the first [Team sters,] stage of [their Title VII] pattern or practice claim under (b)(3) is foreclosed by Castaño," considering that the claim as a whole “implicates predominantly individual-specific issues” and “the plaintiffs have not agreed drop their claims for compensatory and punitive damages as a class action issue ”
- stating that monetary relief deemed “incidental” and thus certifiable under Rule 23(b) (2) “should at least be capable of computation by means of objective standards and not dependent in any significant way on the intangible, subjective differences of each class member’s circumstances”
- holding that monetary relief predominates in (b)(2) class actions unless it is incidental to requested injunctive or declaratory relief, i.e., “damages that flow directly from liability to the class as a whole on the claims forming the basis of the injunctive or declaratory relief”
- holding, in pattern or practice of discrimination case, that “punitive damages must be determined after proof of liability to individual plaintiffs at the second stage . . . , not upon the mere finding of general liability to the class at the first stage”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
Oct. 2, 1998
PER CURIAM: *
Treating the suggestion for rehearing en banc as a petition for panel rehearing, the petition for panel rehearing is DENIED. In denying rehearing, the panel majority makes the following observation: The trial court utilized consolidation under rule 42 rather than class certification under rule 23 to manage this case. We review that decision for abuse of discretion and we find no abuse in this case. We are not called upon to decide whether the district court would have abused its discretion if it had elected to bifurcate liability issues that are common to the class and to certify for class determination those discreet liability issues. Judge Dennis dissents from the denial of panel rehearing.
The court having been polled at the request of one of its members and a majority of the judges who are in regular active service not having voted in favor (see Fed.R.App.P. 35, 5th Cir.R. 35), the suggestion for rehearing en banc is DENIED.
Judge Duhé is recused and did not participate in the consideration of the suggestion for rehearing en banc.