finding no deliberate indifference, in spite of an expert’s testimony to the contrary, when “[tjhere was no evidence of a pattern or practice of constitutional violations committed by overstressed New Orleans officers” and “[tjhere was no evidence showing that the city was aware of the supposedly high stress levels in the NOPD or knew that the absence of a stress management program was likely to endanger the constitutional rights of its citizens.”
How later courts described this case
- finding no deliberate indifference, in spite of an expert’s testimony to the contrary, when “[tjhere was no evidence of a pattern or practice of constitutional violations committed by overstressed New Orleans officers” and “[tjhere was no evidence showing that the city was aware of the supposedly high stress levels in the NOPD or knew that the absence of a stress management program was likely to endanger the constitutional rights of its citizens.”
- finding that, in the case of a fleeing suspect who was shot, when it was disputed whether he was holding a gun, "the jury needed to determine what sequence of events occurred, and, in particular, whether Snyder had a gun-or, if he did not actually have a gun, whether Trepagnier reasonably believed he did."
- concluding that important issues of material fact related to immunity existed and, specifically, “the jury needed to determine what sequence of events occurred, and, in particular, whether [the plaintiff] had a gun—or, if he did not actually have a gun, whether [the defendant] reasonably believed he did”
- holding that an expert’s opinion is not alone sufficient to establish constitutional fault by a municipality where no facts support the inference that the city’s motives were contrary to constitutional standards
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Brown v. Bryan County, 219 F.3d 450 (2000)
The County relies heavily on our decision in Snyder, a case that is distinguishable from the facts presented here.
The opinion
DeMOSS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part:
I concur fully in the foregoing opinion as to Parts I, II, and IV. I cannot concur in Parts III or V. I write to set forth the reasons for my dissent.
As the majority opinion indicates, there was a critical factual issue in this case: whether Snyder had a gun and pointed it at Trepagnier before Trepagnier shot Snyder in the back. Regrettably, the jury was not posed that specific question; if it had been *802 given that question the resulting answer would have resolved the ambiguity and inherent conflict in the jury’s other findings. Since the majority opinion does not set forth the specific interrogatories that the jury answered, I do so in a footnote. 1
I am in complete and fundamental disagreement with the majority’s conclusion that there is no inherent conflict between a finding of excessive force (jury interrogatory no. 1) and a finding of qualified immunity (assumptively jury interrogatory no. 2). A finding that Trepagnier used excessive force in arresting Snyder necessarily involves a determination that the force used by Trepag-nier (shooting Snyder in the back at a range of 6 to 10 inches) was “objectively unreasonable.” However, absent some lawful justification, no reasonable police officer could reasonably believe that shooting a suspect in the back from a distance of 6 to 10 inches would not violate that individual’s constitutional rights. In this case, the jury’s answer to interrogatory no. 2 necessarily means that the jury found that Trepagnier reasonably believed that his actions were “objectively reasonable,” a finding which is in direct conflict with the opposite finding in interrogatory no. 1. As the Tenth Circuit so cogently put it in Street v. Parham, 929 F.2d 537, 540 (10th Cir.1991):
No officer could reasonably believe that the use of unreasonable force did not violate clearly established law. Once the jury concluded that, even under all the circumstances, excessive force had been used, the inquiry was over. This is one of the rare instances where the determination of liability and the availability of qualified immunity depend on the same findings. The qualified immunity question was answered as part of the jury’s consideration of the excessive force claim. See Dixon v. Richer, 922 F.2d 1456, 1463 (10th Cir.1991).
I would additionally point out that interrogatory no. 2 is defective because it asks whether Trepagnier had a “reasonable belief,” and not whether a “reasonable officer” would believe that his actions would violate Snyder’s constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has made clear that the determination as to the reasonableness of the officer’s use of force must be based on an objective and not subjective determination. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 , 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1872 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Consequently, I believe the proper disposition of this case is to reverse the trial court’s judgment granting Trepagnier the benefit of qualified immunity and remand the case for a retrial of Snyder’s claims against Trepagnier. Upon retrial, the trial court should, in my view, require the jury to make the factual determination of whether or not Snyder had a gun and pointed it at Trepagnier, or structure the interrogatories in a manner that requires the jury to find that the force used by Trepagnier was either “objectively unreasonable” or “objectively reasonable” under all the circumstances.
.Do you find that Officer Sidney Trepagnier deprived James Snyder’s [sic] of his constitutional rights by using excessive force in arresting him?
Yes X No_
If your answer to question 1 is ‘'yes," continue on to the remaining questions. If your answer to question 1 is "no” then sign and date this form and return to the courtroom.
2. Do you find that Officer Sidney Trepagnier had a reasonable belief that his actions would not violate James Synder’s [sic] constitutional rights?
Yes X No_
3. Do you find that the constitutional deprivation was caused by a governmental custom, policy, practice or decision of the City of New Orleans?
Yes X No_