noting that _________________________________________________________________ 2 In fact, largely as a result of the Supreme Court's intervening limita- tions on the exclusionary rule, at least one district court in this circuit had refused to apply the rule we established in Workman even before Scott. See Pratt v. United States Parole Comm'n, 717 F. Supp. 382, 385 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (adopting memorandum of magistrate judge). 6 "[i]t is well established that a decision of this Court is binding on other panels unless it is overruled by . . . an intervening decision of the United States Supreme Court"
How later courts described this case
- noting that _________________________________________________________________ 2 In fact, largely as a result of the Supreme Court's intervening limita- tions on the exclusionary rule, at least one district court in this circuit had refused to apply the rule we established in Workman even before Scott. See Pratt v. United States Parole Comm'n, 717 F. Supp. 382, 385 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (adopting memorandum of magistrate judge). 6 "[i]t is well established that a decision of this Court is binding on other panels unless it is overruled by . . . an intervening decision of the United States Supreme Court"
- holding that South Carolina may not invoke capital-specific provisions of AEDPA because petitioner’s habeas corpus petition was finally decided before state’s “mechanism” enacted
- noting that “[i]t is well established that a decision of this Court is binding on other panels unless it is overruled by ... an intervening decision of the United States Supreme Court”
- holding Fourth Circuit precedent is binding until overruled by the United States Supreme Court or an en banc opinion of the Fourth Circuit
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ,
Circuit Judge, concurring:
If the “physical torture” aggravating circumstance were invalid, see ante section II.B, I could not conclude that the error would not have infected the jury’s decision to sentence Smith to death. However, for the reasons set forth in section II.A of the opinion of the court, I believe the district court correctly instructed the jury as to “physical torture” and the evidence supported the jury’s finding of physical torture. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment and in the opinion of the court, except for section II.B.