stating that continuing tort extends limitations because it "could not reasonably have been expected to be made the subject of a lawsuit when it first occurred because its character as a violation did not become clear until it was repeated during the limitations period"
How later courts described this case
- stating that continuing tort extends limitations because it "could not reasonably have been expected to be made the subject of a lawsuit when it first occurred because its character as a violation did not become clear until it was repeated during the limitations period"
- explaining that the plaintiff’s “voluntary departure creates a large hole in [his] cause of action: [i]n requesting reinstatement, [he] seek[s] a remedy for injury that is in large part self-inflicted”
- holding that plaintiffs did not establish a continuing violation where the alleged retaliatory action, according to plaintiffs, “amply manifested itself as a possible retaliation from the start”
- noting that “[c]ourts applying Title VII have consistently focused on ‘ultimate employment decisions such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating ... [and not] interlocutory or mediate decisions' having no immediate effect upon employment conditions.’ ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*770 ROGERS, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I join the opinion of the court save for its treatment of appellants’ request for equitable relief as a matter of constitutional standing. See opinion at [766]. Rather, because there was insufficient evidence to show that appellants were constructively discharged, given their voluntary departures, see opinion at 16-17, their request for equitable relief fails for lack of an evidentiary foundation. This finding seems to me to be the fundamental one. On their pleadings, appellants’ injury is traceable to appellees’ actions; that the court cannot credit the pleadings is not a standing analysis, but a determination of evidentiary sufficiency. See Claybrook v. Slater, 111 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C.Cir.1997); Florida Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 , 664 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.1996) (en banc) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 , 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1953 , 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968)).