finding no liberty interest where inmate spent 70 days confined 24–hours per day in small cell with another inmate, no access to prison work or educational programs, no access to the prison yard, day room, or gym, and no ability to leave cell except for doctor visits and to see the segregation superintendent
How later courts described this case
- finding no liberty interest where inmate spent 70 days confined 24–hours per day in small cell with another inmate, no access to prison work or educational programs, no access to the prison yard, day room, or gym, and no ability to leave cell except for doctor visits and to see the segregation superintendent
- holding that no liberty interest was impli- cated and noting “it was obviously a relatively short period when one considers his 12 year prison sentence”
- holding that no liberty interest was implicated in 70 day stay in disciplinary segregation, two weeks of which also involved discretionary segregation
- noting no protected liberty interest in demotion to C-grade status and loss of commissary privileges
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the majority’s opinion, but I write separately to take exception to the court’s handling of one aspect of Thomas’s argument about yard time, which I fear could lead to confusion about the relevant legal standard in the future.
On page 764, the majority rejects Thomas’s Eighth Amendment claim in part on the ground that he chose to visit the doctor rather than accept the opportunities to exercise in the yard. There is no evidence in the record, however, that supports the assumption that Thomas had any choice in the matter. Rather, his affidavit shows that he was unable, not unwilling, to go to the yard on days when he visited the medical unit. Viewing all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Thomas, as we must, this indicates that Thomas had no discretion over the timing of his medical appointments and that the scheduled appointments conflicted with his assigned yard time. Thomas obviously could not be in two places at the same time. His decision to attend to his medical needs in no way implies that he was willingly foregoing his exercise time.
Notwithstanding the dilemma that he faced, I agree that Thomas failed to show that his constitutional rights were violated. This does not mean that prison administrators are entitled to require inmates to trade off one constitutional right (e.g., medical care) against another (e.g., hygiene, food, exercise). On this record, however, Thomas had access to some exercise opportunities, there is no evidence that his medical needs were severe enough to give rise to constitutional concerns, and his time in segregation did not implicate a protected liberty interest. For those reasons, I concur in the judgment of the court.