Harold Henderson v. Larry Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction David Guntharp, Assistant Director, Arkansas Department of Correction · 129 F.3d 481

explaining that when a prisoner is unable to provide the court with a certified copy of his or her inmate account statement, the court should assess an amount “that is reasonable, based on whatever information the court has about the prisoner’s finances”

How later courts described this case

explaining that when a prisoner is unable to provide the court with a certified copy of his or her inmate account statement, the court should assess an amount “that is reasonable, based on whatever information the court has about the prisoner’s finances”
explaining that when a prisoner is unable to provide the court with a certified copy of her inmate account statement, the court should assess an amount “that is reasonable, based on whatever information the court has about the prisoner’s finances”
explaining that when a prisoner is unable to provide the Court with a certified copy of his prison account statement, the Court should assess an amount “that is reasonable, based on whatever information the court has about the prisoner’s finances”
explaining that when a prisoner is unable to provide the court with a certified copy of his inmate account statement, the court should assess an amount “that is reasonable, based on whatever information the court has about the prisoner’s finances”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

concurring and dissenting.

I concur in so much of the court’s opinion as holds that a prisoner in a civil action may file a motion to proceed under § 1915 despite the fact that the district court has certified that the appeal is not taken in good faith, and that the filing of such a motion triggers the prisoner’s duty to pay the filing fees, subject to certain exceptions. With respect, however, I cannot locate in any statute or common-law principle the authority that the court evidently asserts to promulgate rules for the district courts in cases like the present one, or, indeed, in any other kind of case. The court engages not in adjudication, but in rule-making, and rule-making, moreover, of a kind for which the court does not even purport to find a warrant. I therefore respeet- *486 fully dissent from the portion of the court’s judgment that derives from the part of its opinion regulating the district courts’ handling of eases under the PLRA.