indicating that detention pending an extradition hearing without some indicia of flight risk violates the Due Process Clause
How later courts described this case
- indicating that detention pending an extradition hearing without some indicia of flight risk violates the Due Process Clause
- unofficial tr. of Nov. 1, 1995, hr'g on renewed bail application
- rehearing en banc granted, 124 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir.1997)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
During the course of these extradition proceedings, Giancarlo Parretti was released from custody on bail and fled the country. When a criminal defendant becomes a fugitive from justice, courts have discretion to dismiss the defendant’s appeal because his absence “disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims.” Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 , 90 S.Ct. 498, 499 , 24 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970) (per curiam); see also Roby v. United States Dep’t of the Navy, 76 F.3d 1052 , 1055 n. 2 (9th Cir.1996) (noting that the court would have discretion to dismiss ease based on disentitlement theory where plaintiff took unauthorized leave from the Navy); United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 934 F.2d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir.1991) (noting long history of equitable doctrine of fugitive disentitlement).
Dismissal is an appropriate option under the disentitlement doctrine because dismissal preserves this court’s “interest in efficient, dignified appellate practice.” Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 242 , 113 S.Ct. 1199, 1204-05 , 122 L.Ed.2d 581 (1993). Moreover, Parretti’s flight threatens the effective operation of the appellate process. Parretti’s counsel may have no desire to represent Parretti zealously in future proceedings that may result from the majority’s opinion (e.g., petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc, en banc review, or appeal to the Supreme Court). In addition, this court no longer has control over one of the parties-Parretti. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 724 , 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1595-96 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining how the adversary character of the litigation may be compromised when one of the litigants is a fugitive) (citing Molinaro, 396 U.S. at 366 , 90 S.Ct. at 498-99 ). Because Parretti’s fugitive status creates the risk that the adversary process will not effectively function, we should exercise our discretion and dismiss the present appeal.