noting that Rule 704(b) would preclude expert's opinion as to whether a hypothetical defendant in a hypothetical factual scenario, indistinguishable from the defendant and facts in the case before court, would have the necessary intent
How later courts described this case
- noting that Rule 704(b) would preclude expert's opinion as to whether a hypothetical defendant in a hypothetical factual scenario, indistinguishable from the defendant and facts in the case before court, would have the necessary intent
- recognizing that “the expert was particularly qualified” to give his opinion
- permitting drug courier profile testimony of police expert to assist jury in understanding why a person would conceal a weapon in the engine of a car
- expert testimony as to why people typically hide guns in the engine compartments of their cars
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)
See Fed.R.Evid. 1101(b); United States v. Webb, 115 F.3d 711, 716 (9th Cir.1997) (Jenkins, J., concurring in the result), abrogated on other grounds by Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999).
Abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Lavern Hankey, AKA Poo, Opinion, 203 F.3d 1160 (2000)
115 F.3d 711, 715 (9th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160
The opinion
FLETCHER, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
In addition to concurring in the majority opinion, I concur in Judge Jenkins’ thoughtful and insightful concurrence highlighting the need for district courts to perform adequately the “gate-keeper” function in determining whether “expert testimony” is truly “expert” and likely to be of help to the jury.
I note that our decision here that Daubert informs the district court’s appropriate inquiry into the admissibility of scientific evidence does not suggest that the imperatives of Rule 702 and Rule 104(a) do not apply to technical or other specialized knowledge.